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A NORTH DAKOTA COMMENTARY ON THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
LEONARD H. BUCKLIN*
INTRODUCTION
The proper administration of justice requires established rules
of procedure. In no other way can a great volume of business be done
fairly and efficiently. Equally important, in no other way can the
appearance of justice for all be maintained.
The rules of evidence in trial courts have traditionally been
found in the reported decisions of judges of the appropriate appellate
court. As the mountain of reported cases grows, the job of treating
all persons uniformly becomes more difficult; the instinctive deci-
sion of the judge on the trial bench, who must make quick deci-
sions when objections are made, tends often to be related more to
the date he graduated from law school than to what the legal schol-
ar, with time for adequate research, might find to be the rule of evi-
dence.
The mountain of reported cases blocks a clear view of what the
rules of evidence are. The rules are difficult to locate rapidly when
a crisis suddenly develops in the courtroom. A codification of the rules
of evidence, so that a handy manual is available for all, has thus
become inevitable.
In the federal court system, the Judicial Conference labored
for some eleven years on devising a code of evidence. Its efforts
came to focus in 1965, when the United States Supreme Court ap-
pointed an advisory committee on rules of evidence to formulate un-
iform rules. The committee included a cross-section of eminent law
school professors, judges, and trial attorneys. The resulting work
effort of this committee showed good scholarship and practical for-
mulation.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the product of its com-
mittee, but the United States Congress made substantial changes
before the rules finally became federal law. Effective July 1, 1975,
the federal courts started using this code of evidence rules.
* B.S.L. (1955), J.D. (1957), University of Minnesota; Zuger & Bucklin, Bismarck,
North Dakota; Fellow, International Academy of Trial Lawyers. The author wishes to
acknowledge the help and scholarship furnished by Terry L. Adkins of the North Da-
kota Law Review in preparing the manuscript for publication.
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The procedure committee of the State Bar Association of North
Dakota has been working the last few years on preparing an evi-
dence code, modeled generally upon the federal rules. The State
Bar's procedure committee apparently agreed with a comment by
the North Dakota Supreme Court that there is a "desirability of hav-
ing our rules of evidence compatible with those governing the Federal
courts . . . . "
Upon the urging of the procedure committee of the State Bar
Association of North Dakota, the Bar Association approved submis-
sion of a proposed code to the North Dakota Supreme Court, and the
process of submission is now underway.
It is appropriate at this time to consider the present evidence.
law of North Dakota and compare it with the federal rules of evidence.
We do not intend to discuss in this short article every North Dakota
statute and case concerning trial evidence. The attempt is only to
point out those items which should be of special interest to the North
Dakota practitioner who is actively practicing in both federal and
state courts. The emphasis is on defining what North Dakota's pre-
sent evidence law now is and how it compares with the present fed-
eral rules of evidence.
In this article a reference to "Criminal Rule" means a rule of
the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. A reference to "Civil
Rule" means a rule of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule 101.
SCOPE
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the
United States and before United States magistrates, to the
extent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101.
Criminal Rule 26 and Civil Rule 432 now provide that evidence
is to be admitted if admissible under the common law. The purpose
of the Rules of Evidence is in some instances to change the exist-
ing common law.3
1. State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291, 296-97 (N.D. 1973).
2. N.D.R. CRM. P. 26 states: "The admissibility of evidence and the competency and
privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when a statute or these Rules otherwise
provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
this State in the light of reason and experience." N.D.R. Civ. P. 43 is similar to the above
except that it adds: "In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of evi-
dence governs."
3. One obvious way in which the rules will change the common law development of the
law of evidence is that assumption that wherever the decisions of the courts are in con-
flict with the rules, the earlier court decisions are overruled. This has the effect, accord-
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Rule 102.
PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in ad-
ministration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and de-
lay, and promotion of growth and development of the law
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined.
This rule is similar to Civil Rule 1 and Criminal Rule 2, both of
which provide that the rules shall be construed to secure fairness.
The danger in a general statement such as found in the federal
rule is that notions of "fairness" vary from judge to judge, and
from year to year with the same judge.4 The tendency of the court,
of course, will be to admit more and more evidence. This imposes
a higher duty upon the advocate to restrain himself to presenting
evidence that is truly material and worthy of the court time being
devoted to it.
In another context the North Dakota Supreme Court has indicat-
ed that it rarely will reverse a trial judge who has admitted incom-
petent testimony in a non-jury case.
5 The large amount of discre-
ing to Albert Jenner, of making the code "a great equalizer" which places young inexper-
ienced attorneys on a level with older adversaries in the Federal courts. Hearing on H.R.
5463 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93 Cong., 2d Sess., on Federal Rules
of Evidence at 7 (1974), reprinted in AM. JuR. 2d, Fed. Rules of Evidence, 342 (19).
4. Discretion is, of course, always a problem. However, as one commentator put it:
[Dliscretion need not be, as Lord Camden said, a synonym for lawlessness
or tyranny, if those who create It and wield it and reviews its use are sensi-
tive to the risks and responsibilities it raises, and if they play fair with the
system; for the difference between a government of law and a government of
men is not that the rules decide cases in one and fools in the other. Men,
that is, the judges, always decide. The differencee is in whether judges are
aware of their power, sensitive to their responsibilities and true to the tradi-
tion of the common law.
Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
4 GE)ORGIA L. REV. 43, 109 (1969), quoting Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, 38 THE OHIO
BAR 819, 826 (1965).
5. Schuh v. Allery, 210 N.W.2d 96, 99 (N.D. 1973). Justice Vogel stated:
We believe that a trial judge, in a nonjury case, should ordinarily admit all
evidence which is not clearly inadmissible. A judge who is competent to rule
upon the admissibility of evidence can distinguish in his own mind, when de-
liberating his ultimate decision, between evidence which is admissible and
evidence which is not admissible. The introduction of allgedly inadmissible
evidence in a nonjury case will rarely be reversible error, and it may often
avoid a possible reversal in cases which this court, on appeal, holds that the
evidence is admissible.
We agree with the statement of the Eighth Circuit Court of Apeals in
Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 179 F.2d 377, 379:
'In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to
commit reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected
to or not. An appellate court will not reverse a judgment in a nonjury case
because of the admission of incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent
evidence is insufficient to suport the judgment or unless it affirmatively ap-
pears that the incompetent evidence induced the court to make an essential
finding which would not otherwise have been made. . . . On the other hand,
a trial judge who, in the trial of a nonjury case, attempts to make strict
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, can easily get his decision reversed
by excluding evidence which is objected to, but which, on review, the appel-
late court believes would have been admitted.'
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tion given a trial judge does not, of course, imply that a judge may




(a) EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS RULING. Error
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or ex-
cludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) OBJECTION. In case the ruling is one ad-
mitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context; or
(2) OFFER OF PROOF. In case the ruling is
one excluding evidence, the substance of the evi-
dence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.
(b) RECORD OF OFFER AND RULING. The court
may add any other or further statement which shows the
character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered,
the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct
the making of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) HEARING OF JURY. In jury cases, proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to pre-
vent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the
jury by any means, such as making statements or offers
of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) PLAIN ERROR. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights al-
though they were not brought to the attention of the court.
The doctrine of "harmless error" 7 used in subdivision (a) of
the federal rule is presently the law in North Dakota.8 The Nortff
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure have already made formal excep-
tions unnecessary in North Dakota.9
It has long been the law in North Dakota that a timely objection
must be made and that unless the evidence is clearly inadmissible
for any purpose, the objection must be specific and not general. 0
6. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 102-10 (1975). The authors
point out that "any determination under the proposed rules must be in accord with the
broad principles specified in Rule 102 which underlie the whole body of rules and our
entire system of justice." Id.
7. The rules define harmless error, in civil and criminal cases, as error that does not
affect a substantial right, but what is "harmless" is often a matter of dispute among
judges. See State v. Johnson, 231 N.W.2d 180 (N.D. 1975).
8. N.D.R. Civ. P. 61; N.D.R. Cai,. P. 52.
9. N.D.R. Crv. P. 46.
10. Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964) ; Huston v. Johnson, 29 N.D. 546, 151
N.W. 774 (1915) ; Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
The concept of timely objections is such a part of the fabric of our law of evi-
dence that Wigmore could unequivocably state: "A rule of Evidence not invoked is waived."
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The North Dakota law today is that a party may not complain
if he fails to make a proper offer of proof.11 The suggested rule
would provide a change in those few instances when an offer is un-
necessary because the proferred evidence is apparent.
12
Subdivision (b) of the federal rule provides that a judge sitting
alone has discretion as to whether to question and answer method of
an offer of proof is to be used. This is a change from the present
language of Civil Rule 43 which seems to make it mandatory
that the court take an offer of proof in a question and answer form
if the attorney so desires. The original reason for requiring the
judge to take the offer in a question and answer method was be-
cause that allowed the state supreme court to properly decide the
case upon demand for a trial de novo before the supreme court.
Since trial de novo no longer exists, there is no sufficient rea-
son why offers of proof should be handled differently in judge and
jury tried cases.
Subdivision (c) of the federal rule makes it clear that counsel
can protect his record by asking the questions in a separate proceed-
ing before the court without the jury, and it is not necessary that
the questions on which an offer is based must first be asked in the
presence of the jury.
Subdivision (d) of the federal rule, the doctrine of plain error, is
found in North Dakota case law.'8
Rule 104.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
(a) QUESTIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY GENERALLY.
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a per-
son to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence ex-
cept those with respect to privileges.
(b) RELEVANCY CONDITIONED ON FACT. When
the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or sub-
1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 18, at 321 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original). It should be
noted, however, that a court may not rely on irrelevant evidence to support a verdict even
if it was received without objection. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & MW. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVmENCE,
103-11 (1975), citing Hirsch v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 308 F.2d 562, 567
(9th Cir. 1962). ("Failure to object may make incompetent evidence competent, but it
cannot make irrelevant evidence relevant.").
11. Krogh v. Great West Life Assur. Co., 55 N.D. 722, 214 N.W. 897 (1927) ; Hilleboe
v. Warner, 17 N.D. 594, 118 N.W. 1047 (1908).
12. This is consistent with the rationale behind the offer of proof. The rationale is set
forth in Comment, The Offer of Proof in Grounding Exceptions, 91 YALE L.J., 542, 544
(1922) ; "An appellate court may thus judge whether or not the appellant has been preju-
diced by the exclusion of the evidence. If testimony has been wrongly excluded as incom-
petent, the granting of a new trial would indeed be vain if the evidence proved irrele-
vant or immaterial." (footnotes omitted).
13. LePire v. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 111 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1961).
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ject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support
a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) HEARING OF JURY. Hearings on the admissi-
bility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on the other preliminary
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice
require or, when an accused is a witness, if he so requests.
(d) TESTIMONY BY ACCUSED. The accused does
not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, subject him-
self to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(e) WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY. This rule does not
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevent to weight or credibility.
In State v. Kern, 14 the North Dakota Supreme Court has held
that questions of whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary
are to be determined by the judge. In State v. Nagel,15 the court
noted that the jury is properly excluded during the hearing on the ad-
missibility of confessions. 6 Hence, the federal rule harmonizes with
existing North Dakota law and goes on to add rules with which
few would quarrel in areas where our court has not yet spoken.
It should be noted that federal rules subdivision (d) does not dis-
cuss the use, or prohibition of use, of the recorded testimony receiv-
ed at the preliminary hearing, when the main trial is heard.17 The
principal reason for not specifying the use of preliminary hearing
testimony at the main trial is that this use of preliminary testimony
is in an area of developing constitutional law.
Rule 105.
LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
When evidence which is admissibile as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party
or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly.
The general objection of "incompetent, irrelevant and imma-
terial" is too general and when such a general objection is made
the court can allow the evidence in, even though it is admissible in
part and inadmissible in other parts. It is the duty of the attorney
14. 50 N.D. 927, 198 N.W. 698 (1924) (whether confession voluntary).
15. 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947).
16. This is consistent with what Weinstein calls the "orthodox rule." This is also the
rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103
(1914) : "Questions of the admissibility of evidence are for the determination of the court;
and this Is so whether its admission depend upon matters of law or upon matter of fact."
17. This rule is not, however, intended to immunize the accused from cross-examination
where, In testifying about a preliminary issue, he injects other issues into the hearing.
See 120 CONG. REC. 12253 (1974) (remarks of Subcommittee Chairman).
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to point out the specific objection and then request the court to re-
strict the evidence to its proper scope.'
Rule 106.
REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED
STATEMENTS
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof
is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require
him at that time to introduce any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to
be considered contemporaneously with it.
Rule 106 is consistent with Civil Rule 32(a) (4)19 which pro-
vides a similar rule for the introduction of parts of a deposition at
trial. The rationale is that an erroneous impression created by omis-
sion should be corrected immediately and not days later in a trial.2 0
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Rule 201.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
(a) SCOPE OF RULE. This rule governs only judicial
notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) KINDS OF FACTS. A judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready de-
termination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
(c) WHEN DISCRETIONARY. A court may take judi-
cial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) WHEN MANDATORY. A court shall take judicial
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the neces-
sary information.
(e) OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. A party is en-
titled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of
18. Smith v. Knutson, 78 N.D. 43, 47 N.W.2d 537 (1951). This is the common law
position as presented by Wigmore:
[W]hen an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and becomes admis-
sible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it is not in-
admissible because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it In some other
capacity and because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter
capacity.
1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 13 at 300 (3rd ed. 1940) (emphasis omitted).
19. N.D.R. Cirv. P. 32(a)(4). It should be emphasized that for practical reasons Rule
106 pertains only to writings or recorded statements.
20. Wigmore refers to this principle as "the rule of completeness." See generally 7 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2094-2125 (3d ed. 1940).
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the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) TIME OF TAKING NOTICE. Judicial notice may
be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) INSTRUCTING JURY. In a civil action or pro-
ceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as con-
clusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the
court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not re-
quired to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
A rather complete study on judicial notice has concluded that
"the law of North Dakota on judicial notice is inadequate." 2' 1
North Dakota has statutes which provide for certain specific
items of which the court is to take judicial notice. 22 The North
Dakota statutes have the obvious defect that the specific items are
limited in number. Furthermore, they often no longer conform with
modern day ideas of judicial notice.
23
Not so obvious, but perhaps more important, is the defect inher-
ent in a legislature instructing the courts how its business should be
done. Judicial notice is, and should be, a function of the courts and
not of the legislature.
In the instructions to the jury, courts must take care that they do
not conclusively instruct a jury on the effect of a fact judicially no-
ticed and which the jury must accept as proved under federal rule
subdivision (g). For example, a jury should be instructed that the
American Experience Life Expectancy table shows a life expectancy
of the plaintiff as 23 years and the existence of such a statistic is con-
clusively proved; but the court should not instruct that the life ex-
pectancy of the plaintiff is 23 years. The distinction is between tell-
ing the jury what the fact is, and telling the jury what the effect of
that fact is.
Examples of what kinds of facts can be judicially noticed and
given to the jury would include the following:
(1) A court can take judicial notice that just prior to
collision a motor vehicle has momentum equal to the product
of its weight and velocity.
24
(2) A court can take judicial notice of standard tables of
reaction time and stopping distance. In many cases a court,
while stating it cannot take judicial notice of a precise stop-
21. Whinery, The Uniform Rules of Evidence and the North Dakota Law of Evidence,
33 N.D.L. REv. 5, 9 (1957).
22. N.D. CENT. CoDE ch. 31-10 (1960).
23. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 31-10-02(58) (1960), which states that "[e]very court of
this state will take judicial notice of what is known commonly in the various manufac-
tures and industries."
24. Baker v. Herman Mut. Ins. Co., 17 wls. 2d 597, 117 N.W.2d 725 (1962).
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ping distance, has taken judicial notice of general tables
of stopping distance and reaction time.
25
The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that the present
statutory list is the extent of items to be noticed judicially.20 But to
the contrary it has also indicated that it will decide for itself what
it will notice. 27 The latter statement appears a correct statement
of what the court has in fact done.2 Hence, the federal rule is not
a startling expansion of court power.
However, rule subdivision (b) (2) provides that the court may take
judicial notice not only of facts generally known but also of facts
"capable of accurate and ready determination. ' 29 This increases
the scope of judicial notice beyond that ordinarily used in courts of
this state. 0
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS
Rule 301.
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise pro-
vided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presump-
tion imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet
the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion,
which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom
it was originally cast.
25. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 979 (1962). A standard table is found in Am. JuR. 2d
Desk Book, 456 (1962).
26. In re McKee's Estate, 67 N.D. 504, 274 N.W. 601 (1937).
27. State ex rel. Erickson v. Burr, 16 N.D. 581, 113 N.W. 705 (1907).
28. See Whinery, supra note 21, at 11-12.
29. When facts do not meet the needed degree of certainty, the traditional approach, as
pointed out by Professor Davis, has been to require proof within the framework of our
adversary system:
The reason we use trial-type procedure, I think, is that we make the practi-
cal judgment, on the basis of experience, that taking evidence, subject to
cross-examination and rebuttal, is the best way to resolve controversies, in-
volving disputes of adjudicative facts, that is, facts pertaining to the parties.
The reason we require a determination on the record is that we think fair
procedure in resolving disputes of adjudicative facts calls for giving each
party a chance to meet in the appropriate fashion the facts that come to the
tribunal's attention, and the appropriate fashion for meeting disputed adjudi-
cative facts includes rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, usually confronta-
tion, and argument....
Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, 1964 Perspectives
of Law, 69, 93.
30. See, e.g., Wickum v. Arneson, 63 N.D. 594, 249 N.W. 709 (1933) (court cannot Judi-
cially notice facts in the transcript of a prior case between the same parties).
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Chapter 31-11 of the North Dakota Century Code contains lists
of "conclusive" and "disputable" presumptions.' Other presump-
tions are scattered throughout the statutes.3 2 These statutory pre-
sumptions, are not all inclusive and the courts have stated other pre-
sumptions.
3 3
The federal rule as to how presumptions are treated can best
be illustrated by an example. Suppose that the plaintiff must show
delivery of a letter; the mailing of the letter gives rise to a pre-
sumption that it was delivered, but that the defendant testifies the
letter was not in fact delivered to him. In such a case the presump-
tion of delivery of the letter does not disappear from the case merely
because the defendant testifies he did not receive it. The presump-
tion continues in the case. The jury is instructed that mailing is suf-
ficient to find there was delivery. But the jury is told that the plain-
tiff must prove delivery by a preponderance of the evidence and it
is up to them to determine whether that burden has been met. The
jury is not instructed that the presumption itself is "evidence" (the
federal house amendment that would have specifically so provided
was rejected by Congress).-
North Dakota does -have a statute which says that if a presump-
tion is not controverted by evidence "the jurors are bound to find
according to the presumption."' 35 This is consistent with the federal
rule which has the effect that if there is no evidence there is a direc-
tion against the party who has the burden of coming forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.
The federal rule also seems generally compatible with the North
Dakota case law regarding the effect of a presumption when the op-
posing party does introduce evidence. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has indicated that once facts have been introduced a presump-
tion may disappear.' 6 By this the court apparently meant that the
presumption disappeared as evidence. In McKenzie v. Hanson,
3 7
the court held that after there was contrary evidence "an inference"
still continues in the case to be weighed by the trier of facts against
the contrary evidence. This would seem to be consistent with the
idea that the presumption is not evidence itself, but only a common
sense notion that the jury may continue to consider and weigh against
the contrary evidence.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 31-11 (Supp. 1973).
32. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-01 to -02 (1971) (legitimacy of children); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 41-16-05 (1960) (term of realty lease presumed to be one year unless other-
wise stated in lease).
33. See, e.g., Thompson v. Nettum, 163 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1968) (driver with retrograde
amnesia Is entitled to presumption of due care).
34. See Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1974).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-01 (1960).
86. Schillerstrom v. Schlllerstrom, 75 N.D. 667, 32 N.W.2d 106 (1948).
37. 143 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1966).
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The federal rule does not speak about the situation of identical
conflicting presumptions. The North Dakota rule is that identical
conflicting presumptions balance and cancel each other out so that
the jury need not be instructed at all about it. 8 However this result
is consistent with the federal rule.
Rule 302.
APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a pre-
sumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim
or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of deci-
sion is determined in accordance with State law.
The federal legislature left the law with respect to presumptions
in this area to state determination, but where a federal cause of
action3 9 is being tried in state court, it would seem that the federal
law regarding presumptions on the federal cause of action would
have to be followed.
40
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 401.
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
This federal rule is established in the case law of North Dakota.
4'
Rule 402.
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE;
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as other-
wise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
38. See Thompson v. Nettum, 163 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1968).
99. E.g., Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
40. Rule 302 clearly recognizes that the rationale of Erie v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) requires the effect of some presumptions in civil actions to be governed by state
law. However, Erie does not apply to a federal claim or Issue even if jurisdiction is
based on diversity. See Steele v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1972).
41. See Hogan v. Knoop, 191 N.W.2d 263 (N.D. 1971) ; Bale v. Brudevig, 77 N.D. 494,
43 N.W.2d 753 (1950).
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Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory au-
thority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Often, evidence is not relevant because the pleadings are not
broad enough.4 2 The remedy for narrow pleadings is to amend them
as provided for under the rules of civil procedure. 43 However, fre-




Since it is "all" relevant evidence that is admissible, the evidence
is admissible even if it is the sort of thing that might be suspect
because of the party's natural inclination to say what is most favor-
able to him.4 5 Thus in Hochestetler v. Graber,46 the North Dakota
court pointed out that a party's testimony of his intent at a time in
the past is relevant when intent of an act is relevant, and thus the
party's testimony is admissible.47
The North Dakota court has ruled that preliminary questions
regarding the admissibility of evidence are to be determined by the
court and not by the jury.45 This is consistent with federal rule 104.49
More than that, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court has ruled
that -such evidence is not admissible because it is not relevant. 0
Experiments, of course, may often be relevant and helpful. The
North Dakota court has held that experimental results may be shown
if the following foundation is laid:
1. That the persons making the experiment were compe-
tent;
2. That the conditions surrounding the experiment were
substantially similar to those prevailing at the time of the
occurrence to which they relate;
3. That the results themselves are relevant to an issue
in the case; and
42. See, e.g., Roberge v. Cambridge Co-op. Creamery Co., 243 Minn. 230, 67 N.W.2d
400 (1954).
43. N.D.R. Cirv. P. 15
44. See, e.g., Bohn v. Eichhorst, 181 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1971) (pleading psychiatric prob-
lems) ; Crosby v. Sande, 180 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1970), distinguishing Froh v. Hein, 76
N.W. 701, 39 N.W.2d 11 (N.D. 1949), (pleading intoxication).
45. See, e.g., State ex rel. Olson v. Royal Indem. Co., 44 N.D. 550, 175 N.W. 625
(1919).
46. 78 N.D. 90, 48 N.W.2d 15 (1951).
47. It Is because of this rule of relevancy which initially admits evidence even though
from a suspect source, that attacks may be made on the existence of bias or improper
attitudes of a witness. See State v. Berger, 148 N.W.2d 331 (N.D. 1967) (illicit relation-
ship with a party to the action).
48. King v. Hanson, 13 N.D. 85, 99 N.W. 1085 (1904).
49. The same concept is repeated in FED. R. EvID. 1101(d)(1). However, Rule 1008
leaves this determination to the trier of fact in the case of certain questions concerning
the admission of evidence to prove the contents of writings, recordings or photographs.
As to how to determine these preliminary questions, see FED. R. EVID. 104 (b).
50. Schmidt v. Stone, 50 N.D. 91. 194 N.W. 917 (1923) (foundational facts on which
there is no controversy should not be submitted to the jury).
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4. That the experiment had been honestly and fairly
made.
5'
It should be noted that an attorney's use of a blackboard diagram




EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 403 is not new law, but is substantially a restatement of pres-
ent law. The North Dakota law is that the question whether any evi-
dence should be excluded for remoteness rests largely in the discre-
tion of the trial court.5 3 Note how the federal rule uses the discre-
tionary word "may" in the rule.
Generally, skillful attorneys can make almost anything relevant.
"Relevant" simply means whether an item tends to prove or dis-
prove any fact in issue.54 The question is more often whether it is
material enough (makes enough difference) to be admitted when
balanced against possible prejudice to, or time lost from, a just and
orderly trial. Generally, the discretion of the trial judge as to mater-
iality will be upheld.55 Thus it has been held that it is within the
discretion of the trial judge to allow or disallow testimony as to the
speed of a car some distance from the scene of the accident. 56 How-
ever, there are some limits to the judge's discretion, as for example,
the holding that the fact that a person is late for an appointment is
not evidence that he might be traveling at a high rate of speed.
57
Questions of whether the material is "relevant" are often confused
with the question of whether the offered evidence is simply so weak
and removed from the issues being litigated that it is not worth the
time involved to consider it. A good example of this confusion is
Bale v. Brudevig,5 8 holding that cost cannot be shown when it is the
value on the market that is at issue.
51. Larson v. Meyer, 161 N.W.2d 165 (N.D. 1968).
52. See Teegarden v. Dahl, 138 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1965) ; Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 239 (1962)
Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1955).
53. Lake v. Neubauer, 87 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1958).
54. Williams Elec. Co-op. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 79 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1956).
55. Jones v. Boeing Co,, 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967).
56. Thompson v. Nettum, 163 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1968) (evidence was properly excluded).
57 Id.
58. '7 N.D. 494, 43 N.W.2d 753 (1950).
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The North Dakota court has followed the same theory of the
federal rule in pointing out that material should be excluded at times
simply because it is not of sufficient probative value to be commen-
surate with the time involved in presenting it.59 Thus evidence merely
tending to prove a general way of acting or a similar act or incident
at a different time and place and under different circumstances has
little probative force on the issues and is immaterial. 0 But when
the evidence has to do with other accidents or the lack of accidents
from the same exact inanimate cause as involved in the accident
litigation, it is of sufficient probative value to be admitted. 61
Rule 404.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evi-
dence of a person's character or a trait of his character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) CHARACTER OF ACCUSED. Evidence of
a pertinent trait of his character offered by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) CHARACTER OF VICTIM. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the pro-
secution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) CHARACTER OF WITNESS. Evidence of
of the character of a witness, as provided in rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be ad-
missible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
This rule is consistent with the existing North Dakota case law.
In Thornburg v. Perleberg6 2 the North Dakota Supreme Court pointed
out that evidence of past accidents and traffic violations is not ad-
missible for the purpose of showing negligence in a particular ac-
59. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967).
60. Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961).
61. See, e.g., Lyon v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, 251 Minn. 285, 87 N.W.2d 651
(1958).
62. 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1968).
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cident at the trial. The court has also pointed out that evidence
of other crimes may be admissible for the purpose of showing prepa-
ration or a plan to commit a crime.
63
Rule 405.
METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) REPUTATION OR OPINION. In all cases in
which evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.
On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant
specific instances or conduct.
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. In cases
in which character or a trait of character of a person is
an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.
There is North Dakota case law indicating that proof of charac-
ter may be made by testimony as to reputation in the community,
but it cannot be made by testimony in the form of a personal opin-




Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine prac-
tice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and
regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to
prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a
particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice.
This rule is consistent with the scant authority in North Dakota
which has discussed habit used to show what was done in the ab-
sence of direct proof.65 The North Dakota Supreme Court has cau-
tioned that where evidence of habit is offered on the issue of negli-
gence, such evidence must be limited to conduct which constitutes
a person's regular practice of meeting the particular situation with
specific conduct, thus showing that the doing of the act claimed to
be habit and the conduct of the person in meeting a certain situation
were practically automatic. 66 The conduct which is claimed to
63. State v. Berenson, 65 N.D. 480, 260 N.W. 256 (1935).
64. State v. Nierenberg, 80 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1956).
65. Dlmond v. Kling, 221 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1974) ; Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819 (N.D
1968).
66. Dlmond v. Kling, 221 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1974).
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have constituted habit must be repeated often and must not be too
remote in time or place from the time or place of the occurrence
being considered in the action before the court.6 7
Both under this rule and North Dakota practice, mere evidence





When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissi-
ble to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection
with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion
of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for ano-
ther purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasi-
bility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or im-
peachment.
This rule is consistent with existing North Dakota case law.6 9
Rule 408.
COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to
furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept,
a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either valid-
ity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct
or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise
not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is pre-
sented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is of-
fered for another purpose, such as proving bias or pre-
judice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay,
or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
North Dakota case law has held inadmissible offers of compro-
mise. 70 The confusing language of the Supreme Court in Austinson
v. Kilpatrick71 makes it uncertain whether existing North Dakota
67. Id.
68. Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964); Trautman v. New Rockford-Fessen-
den Transp. Ass'n., 181 N.W.2d 754 (N.D. 1974).
69. See, e.g., Huus v. Ringo, 76 N.D. 763, 39 N.W.2d 505 (1949) ; Van Ornum v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1973).
70. Larson v. Quanrud, Brink and Riebold, 78 N.D. 70, 47 N.W.2d 743 (1950).
71. 105 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1960).
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case law would hold a completed and executed compromise inad-
missible, although the same policy reasons would apply to a com-
pleted offer as to the offer itself.
The point where the federal rule surely differs from the existing
North Dakota law is in regard to statements made during the com-
promise negotiations when the statements relate to independent
facts. North Dakota would admit such statements. 72 The federal
rule, in contrast, excludes them. The "safety valve" on the feder-
al rule excluding such independent statements is the sentence which
prohibits a party from saying something in settlement negotiations
and thereby precluding it from evidence even though it was dis-
coverable through independent sources.78
Rule 409.
PAYMENT OF MEDICAL AND SIMILAR EXPENSES
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay
medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an in-
jury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.
The majority of cases in the United States follow a rule similar
to the federal rule.74 However there are no North Dakota cases. The
federal rule is consistent with section 32-39-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code which provides that "voluntary partial payment" of
a tort claim shall not be construed as an admission of liability.75
The statute was intended to facilitate compromise payments while
the negotiations were still being carried on, but the wording is broad
enough to include actual payment of expenses even though no ne-
gotiations are going on regarding settlement.
Rule 410.
OFFER TO PLEAD GUILTY; NOLO CONTENDERE; WITHDRAWN
PLEA OF GUILTY
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, evi-
dence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere
to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements
made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or of-
fers is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case,
72. Gunther v. Baker, 48 N.D. 1071, 188 N.W. 575 (1922).
73. The policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee was that "[a) party should not be
able to immunize from admissibility documents otherwise discoverable merely by offering
them in a compromise negotiation." Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S.
REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1974).
74. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 291 (1951).
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-39-01 (Supp. 1973).
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or proceeding against the person who made the plea or
offer. This rule shall not apply to the introduction of volun-
tary and reliable statements made in court on the record,
in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers
where offered for impeachment purposes or in a subse-
quent prosecution of the declarant for perjury or false
statement.
This rule shall not take effect until August 1, 1975, and
shall be superseded by any amendment to' the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which is inconsistent with this
rule, and which takes effect after the date of the enact-
ment of the Act establishing these Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.
In North Dakota the basic rule is that a plea of guilty in a crim-
inal action can be used as evidence against the same party in a sub-
sequent civil action, not only as an admission against interest, ad-
missible as substantive evidence, but also as evidence effecting the
credibility of the defendant. 76 However, a plea of guilty may be ex-
plained by the defendant when he is in a civil case.
77
There is no North Dakota law as to what is to be the effect of a
plea of guilty later withdrawn. Logically, if the plea of guilty can be
used as an admission against interest, it would seem that a plea of
guilty, even though later withdrawn, should be admissible with the
defendant given a chance to explain his actions. However, the policy
expressed by the federal rule is a matter of encouraging plea bar-
gaining and giving precedence to criminal procedure.
The reason why the federal rule states that it does not take ef-
fect until August 1, 1975, is that the federal courts and Congress have
pending before them a proposed change to Rule 11 (c) (6) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 8 The pending rule of criminal
procedure would make Rule 410 unnecessary. 9 If North Dakota
were to adopt a code of evidence rule it might consider the crimin-
al rules and decide whether they want the equivalent of Rule 410 in




Evidence that a person was or was not insured against
76. See, e.g., Engstrom v. Nelson, 40 N.D. 530, 171 N.W. 90 (1919) (assault and bat-
tery).
77. Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1954).
78. See Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 62 F.R.D. 271, 276, 286 (1974).
The Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e)(6),
state that the proposal is "taken from rule 410, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates (Nov. 1971)." Id. at 286.
79. "Nothing turns on whether the rule appears in the Federal Rules of Evidence or
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The two rules can easily be interpreted so as
not to be "inconsistent." J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE, 410-4, (1975).
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liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not re-
quire the exclusion of evidence of insurance against lia-
bility when offered for another purpose, such as proof of
agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a
witness.




Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory au-
thority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions the pro-
ceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or politi-
cal subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
The federal rule merely states that the state rules regarding
privilege should apply. One approach to this North Dakota commen-
tary might be to simply ignore a discussion of North Dakota privi-
lege law, since the federal rules would obviously make no change
in existing law.
However, for purposes of logical completeness it seems desir-
able to state the main outlines of the North Dakota law on privilege."
1. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution states:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. 82
80. See Beardsley v. Ewing, 40 N.D. 373, 168 N.W. 791 (1918); N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-16-11 (1960) (financial responsibility insurance required of car drivers shall not be
evidence of negligence); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-18-33 (1960) (insurance required of a
common carrier shall not be disclosed to jury).
81. Any errors in this article are accepted by this author as being his own. However,
this author wishes to state his debt to the extensive research done by William P. Pearce
and furnished to the Procedure Committee of the State Bar Association In connection with
their review of the federal rules. Most of this commentary about privilege comes from
his research and with his permission.
82. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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Section 31-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code reiterates
the constitutional privilege and provides for eliminating the privi-
lege with a grant of immunity. The scope of the constitutional privi-
lege cannot be narrowed by a statute. 83 In re Beer84 held inv-alid a
statute which provided that a witness must answer questions con-
cerning an alleged offense committed by another and only that the
testimony given by the witness "shall in no way be used against
him." The court found that the statute was in conflict with Section
13 of the Constitution, because although the specific answers could
not be used against the witness they might lead to other evidence
that could incriminate him.
8 5
By taking the stand in his own behalf, the defendant in a crimi-
nal action waives the privilege only as to the crime for which he is be-
ing charged. Thus, if the answers to questions would have no tenden-
cy to establish his guilt of that crime, the privilege may still be
claimed.
6
Several older North Dakota cases have held that the privilege
did not extend to the keeping of records required by law.87 Thus,
in State ex rel. McClory v. Donovan,88 the defendant was charged
with unlawful sale of intoxicting liquor, and sought to invoke the
privilege to keep out of evidence the records of sales which he was
required to keep by law. The court held the privilege inapplicable
because these records were public, not private, documents. They
were public registers, required to be kept for the benefit of the pub-
lic.
In State ex rel. Flaherty v. Hanson,89 the court refused to allow
the privilege in connection with receipts issued to the defendant by
the United States government for payment of the tax as a retail deal-
er in intoxicating liquor. Under state law the receipts had to be reg-
istered and published, and at the time the sale of intoxicating liquor
was illegal in the state. Citing Donovan, the court stated: "It is cer-
tainly legitimate for the legislature, under its police power, to re-
quire the utmost publicity in this respect to the end that a law pro-
hibiting a business injurious to the public welfare may be strictly en-
forced."90
It is doubtful that if either Donovan or Hanson could come up in
the same factual setting today it would have the same result. Under
the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Marchet-
83. In re Beer, 17 N.D. 184, 115 N.W. 672 (1908).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 190, 115 N.W. at 674-75.
86. State v. Manning, 184 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965).
87. See notes 88 & 89 infra.
88. 10 N.D. 203, 86 N.W. 709 (1901).
89. 16 N.D. 347, 113 N.W. 371 (1901).
90. Id. at 354, 113 N.W. at 374.
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ti v. United States,91 and Grosso v. United States,92 the obligation to
register and pay an occupational tax under the federal wagering
tax statutes is a violation of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. These cases would appear to be on all fours with
Hanson and closely analogous to Donovan.
The privilege against self-incrimination has not been restricted
in its application to criminal actions, despite the specific reference
in constitutional and statutory provisions only to a "criminal case."
Thus, in State v. Borstad,3 the court expressly stated that the con-
stitutional privilege was recognized and preserved in the special stat-
utory proceeding to remove a public official from office. Also, it is
implicit in the court's discussion of privilege in State v. McKay,
94
which was actually a civil case, that the privilege is not limited to
criminal actions.
2. Records of and Reports to Public Officer.
Section 31-01-06(4) of the North Dakota Century Code states:
A public officer cannot be examined as to communications
made to him in official confidence when the public interests
would suffer by the disclosure.
Whether the public interests would suffer in any particular case
is presumably a question of law for the court after an offer of proof
has been made. There do not appear to be any North Dakota cases
in which this provision has been construed.
Section 27-05.1-13 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that communications from parties to the family court counselor in
any proceeding in the court are made "in official confidence.
' 95 ,If
the public interests would suffer by disclosure, then Section 31-01-06
(4) would also be directly applicable.
North Dakota law does have various statutes providing for se-
crecy of certain documents and records. For example, Section 27-05.1-
13 provides that the files and records of the family court and its coun-
selor may not be inspected without a court order. 96 Another ex-
ample is provided by Section 27-20-51, which provides that the files
and records of the court in a proceeding under the Uniform Juven-
ile Court Act may be inspected only by certain persons or agen-
cies. 97 Similarly, the papers and records in an adoption proceed-
ing are subject to inspection only upon consent of the court and all
91. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
92. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
93. 27 N.D. 533, 147 N.W. 380 (1914).
94. 54 N.D. 801, 211 N.W. 435 (1926).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05.1-13 (1974).
96. Id.
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-51 (1974).
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interested persons.98 An example of such a statute pertaining to re-
turns required to be filed by law is provided by Section 57-38-57, re-
lating to the secrecy of income tax returns.99
3. Lawyer-Client Privilege.
An attorney, without the consent of his client, cannot be ex-
amined as to any communication made by the client to him
nor as to his advice given thereon in the course of profession-
al employment. . . .100
The purpose underlying this rule was stated by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Bolyea v. First Presbyterian Church of Wilton.1 10
"The privilege of the attorney-client relationship is grounded upon
the necessity of providing for every client a freedom from any ap-
prehension in discussing the most personal matters with his attor-
ney, and to encourage the client freely to communicate with his at-
torney, without fear of disclosure.' 011 2 If the alleged client does not
want secrecy, the privilege does not exist.
[I]f the client chooses to make or receive his commun-
ication in the presence of a third person, it ceases to be con-
fidential and, therefore, is not entitled to the protection af-
forded by the rule. 03
The court allowed the testimony of the attorney and his secre-
tary, noting that the other persons present were not necessary to the
purpose or objectives of the consultation with the attorney.
Where there is an unnecessary third party present during
an attorney-client conversation, any statements made will
be considered non-confidential and not within the ambit of
the attorney-client testimonial privilege.104
The declarations of Ella and Dan Sweeney to which O'Con-
nor testified were made in the presence of each other and
were repeated thereafter, when both were present, to other
members of the O'Connor family. It is clear from the evi-
dence that the Sweeneys intended that these declarations
should not be confidential. 10 5
The availability of the privilege rests on the existence of an at-
torney-client relationship. The communications are privileged if
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1971).
99. N.D." CENT. CODE § 57-38-57 (1972).
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-06 (1972).
101. 196 N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1972).
102. Id. at 153; accord, In re Graf's Estate, 119 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1963).
103. Bolyea v. First Presbyterian Church, 196 N.W.2d 153-54 (N.D. 1972).
104. State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700, 702 (N.D. 1968).
105. O'Connor v. Inumele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1950).
A NORTH DAKOTA COMMENTARY
made at the time such a relationship existed.106 In the Fosston case,
the court also based the exclusion of the attorney's testimony on a
statute which provided that an attorney shall maintain inviolate the
confidence and secrets of his client.
0 7
Stormon v. Weiss'0 is an example of a case where the necessary
relationship did not exist. The court found that the communications
in question were made six years prior, at a time when the attorney
was not the regular attorney for the 'objecting party and when the
attorney did not consider that he was giving professional advice at
the time. Therefore the communications were not made in the
course of a professional relationship and were not privileged.
Another example where no attorney-client relationship was found
to exist is Bolyea v. First Presbyterian Church of Wilton.109 In Bolyea
the deceased grantor had gone to an attorney to have two deeds
drawn up. The court held that the attorney had merely acted as a
scrivener, preparing the deeds in accordance with the instructions
of the grantor, and pointed out that the grantor had refused the
proffered advice of the attorney to accomplish his objective by will
rather than by deed. Since ther was no confidential advice or con-
sultation in connection with the drawing of the deeds, the privilege
was not available.
The burden of showing that the relationship of attorney and cli-
ent existed at the time the communications were made rests upon
the person who is objecting to the admission of the communications
into evidence." 0
The client himself may properly claim the privilege."" In Shong
v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, Inc.,1 2 the privilege was suc-
cessfully claimed by a personal representative of the deceased cli-
ent, though there is no discussion in the decision of the question of
who may claim the privilege.
North Dakota has not yet ruled on the point, but many states
have held that a statement given to an insurance representative, al-
though a layman, is a privileged communication to an attorney
where it is taken for use by attorneys to be selected by the insured to
represent the insured."13
106. Fosston Mfg. Co. v. Lemke, 44 N.D. 343, 175 N.W. 723 (1919). The necessity for
the relationship is recognized, of course, in all the decisions dealing with the privilege.
107. Id., discussing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-13-01(4) (1974). This statute was also referred
to In State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1968), but there the privilege was held
to have been waived.
108. 65 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1954).
109. 196 N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1972).
110. Shong v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, Inc., 70 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1955);
Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1954).
111. Leistikow v. Zuelsdorf, 18 N.D. 511, 122 N.W. 340 (1909).
112. 70 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1955).
113. Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
4. Physician-Patiefnt Privilege.
A physician or surgeon, without the consent of his patient,
cannot be examined as to any information acquired in at-
tending the patient or as to any communication made by the
patient to him in the course of professional employment.1 1
In State v. Werner, 15 the physician was allowed to testify that
the defendant was afflicted with a particular disease. The court held
that he had testified not as to information acquired in attending the
defendant professionally but only to prove a conversation in which
the physician had told the state's attorney that the defendant had
the disease. The court pointed out that the state's attorney could
have equally testified to the conversation, with any hearsay problem
overcome by the fact that the defendant had also been present, ap-
parently on the theory that his failure to deny the statement was an
implied admission.
Communications from a patient in a'hospital need not be made
to the physician in charge of the patient in order to be privileged.
Communications may be made to an intern,"16 or to nurses. 1" 7 As with
the physician, not all the information acquired by a nurse is privi-
leged. Only such information as is necessarily imparted to the nurse
as an assistant in administering to the patient and which is neces-
sary to enable the physician to prescribe comes within the privilege.
Objection should be made to each question asked of the nurse so
that the court can determine whether or not the information sought
was acquired by the nurse while she was acting as the physician's
assistant.1" 8
The burden of establishing the existence of the privilege in a par-
ticular case is upon the party seeking to exclude the evidence, and
it is, of course, a question of law whether it applies. "[T]he ques-
tion of the privileged character of the testimony is for the court,
taking into consideration all the circumstances, and if necessary
the opinion of the physician, and the belief of the patient.""' 9
When the party calls his own treating physician and examines
him as to the treatment he gave, he thereby waives the privilege
and the other party may fully cross-examine the physician.1
20
The cases generally recognize that the patient himself can, of
course, claim the privilege. Until 1969 in North Dakota, howeyer,
the privilege could not be waived, though it could be claimed, by the
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1973).
115. 16 N.D. 83, 112 N.W. 60 (1907).
116. Eureka-Maryland Assur. Co. v. Gray, 121 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1941), citing Meyer
v. Russell, 55 N.D. 546, N.W. 857 (1927), in support of its position.
117. Meyer v. Russell, 55 N.D. 546, 214 N.W. 857 (1927).
118. Id.
119. Booren v. McWilliams, 26 N.D. 558, 576, 145 N.W. 410, 414 (1914).
120. McDonnell v. Monteith, 59 N.D. 750, 231 N.W. 854 (1930).
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personal representative of a deceased client. In Auld v. Cathro,1l
which was a will contest, the court held that the husband as person-
al representative and heir of the wife could not waive the physician-
patient privilege in order to have the physician testify as to the de-
ceased wife's mental capacity. The court found the privilege to be
personal and felt that the fear of publication of confidential commun-
ications after death might well inhibit a full disclosure of informa-
tion necessary for the preservation of the health of the patient.
In Lembke v. Unke,1 22 however, the North Dakota Supreme
Court expressly overruled Auld v. Cathro. The court found that the
interests of the estate and the deceased would not be prejudiced byallowiiga person standing in place of the testator to waive the priv-
ilege and emphasized the. importance of having the testimony of the
physician on the issue of mental capacity of the testator: "[T]he
objective of statutes securing the privilege is in no way thwarted by
permitting those who stand in the place of or represent decedents to
waive the physician-patient privilege and . . . justice will be more
apt to result from such waiver, because it will aid in reaching the
truth as to the existence of testamentary capacity on the part of the
patient .... ",128
North Dakota law provides that when a person "testifies as a
witness" he waives the privilege as to communication to his doctor.
1 24
North Dakota rules providing for waiver of the privilege when
the examined party-requests a copy of the physician's report after
a court-ordered physical -or mental examination, is analogous in
some resepcts to this exception.
1 25
It might be noted that Minnesota has ruled that when the phy-
sician-patient privilege is used to bar testimony, the adversary may
make fair comment on his inability to obtain the information, and
may force the assertion of the privilege in the hearing of the jury so
that the basis for argument can be laid. 26 The court may also in-
struct the jury that an unfavorable inference may be drawn.127
5. Husband-Wife Privilege
A husband cannot be examined as a witness for or against
his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her hus-
band without his consent, nor can either, during the mar-
riage or afterwards, without the consent of the other, be ex-
121. 20 N.D. 461, 128 N.W. 1025 (1910).
122. 171 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1969).
128. Id. at 847. Since both Auld and Lemke deal with the right of the personal repre-
sentative to waive the privilege, it is implicit in the decisions that he has the right to
claim the privilege.
124. N*.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-07 (1973).
125. N.D.R. Crv. P. 35(b)(2).
126. Nelson v. Ackerman, 249 Minn. 582, 83 N.W.2d .500 (1957).
127. Soukup v. Summer, 269 Minn. 472, 131 N.W.2d 551 (1964).
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amined as to any communication made by one to the other
during the marriage. This section, shall not apply to a civil
action or proceeding by one against the other, nor to a civil
action or proceeding where one spouse attacks the character
of the other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding to enforce
support of minor children.12
Earlier statutes did make a husband and wife incompetent to
be witnesses against the other; the bar could not be removed by a
waiver. The purpose of these statutes was to preserve the peace and
harmony of the marital relationship,'29 and this purpose also under-
lies the privilege statute' 3 0
In State v. Bell,"'1 the court held that it was proper to ask the
wife, while she was on the stand for cross-examination, whether she
would allow her husband to testify, and also proper, after her refus-
al, for the state's attorney to comment during final argument on the
reason why the husband had not testified. "The jury were entitled
to know why he was not called .... The privilege is a shield and not
a sword. It is not conferred to enable him who exercises it thereby
to strengthen his case.' '31 2 The opinion emphasizes that no inference
adverse to the wife may be drawn from her exercise of the privilege,
however.
A special statutory privilege is provided to parties taking part
in a conference with the family court counselor:
No statement or other admission made by either party
in the court of any conference held under this chapter may be
received in evidence against the party making the same,
without such party's consent in any action..33
6. Clergyman Privilege
A clergyman or priest, without the consent of the person
making the confession, cannot be examined as to any confes-
sion made to him in his professional character in the course
of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 34
7. Voter Privilege
"All elections by the people shall be by secret ballot, subject to




128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-02 (1960). The title of § 31-01-02 provides another example
of the confusion between the concepts of privilege and competence, since it refers to "com-
petence of husband and wife as witness," whereas the language of the section is in fact
couched in terms of a waivable privilege.
129. Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151, 46 N.W. 680 (1875).
130. State v. Bell, 67 N.D. 382, 272 N.W. 834 (1937) ; Evenson v. Nelson, 39 N.D. 623,
168 N.W. 36 (1918).
131. 67 N.D. 382, 272 N.W. 334 (1937).
132. Id. at 391-92, 272 N.W. at 338.
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05.1-14 (1960).
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06(2) (1960).
135. N.D. CONST art. 5, § 129.
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"While it is axiomatic that a qualified elector cannot be compel-
led to disclose for whom he voted, it is also true that his privilege of
secrecy is entirely a personal one, and a voter himself may waive
his privilege and testify for whom he voted."' 138 Since the privilege
is personal to the voter, the court held that the party who sought to
claim it, and who was not the voter, could not do so.
8. General Privilege in Discovery Proceedings
The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a pro-
tective order may be obtained in a discovery proceeding specifying
"that certain matters may not be inquired into, or that the scope of
the discovery be limited to certain matters. ' ' 187 This rule appears
to state a very general kind of privilege, to be granted, on good
cause shown, in the discretion of the court. It is different from other
privileges in that it requires a court order and cannot simply be
claimed by the holder.
9. School Counselor's Privilege
"For the purpose of counseling in a school system, any
elementary or secondary school counselor possessing a valid
North Dakota guidance credential from the department of
public instruction, and who has been duly appointed a coun-
selor for a school system by its proper authority, shall be
legally immune from disclosing any privileged or confiden-
tial communication made to such counselor in a counseling
interview. Such communication shall be disclosed when re-
quested by the counselee."" 38
10. Newsman's Privilege
North Dakota law provides for a privilege for news reporters un-
less the judge finds that the failure to disclose sources of information
will cause a miscarriage of justice. 3 9
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES
Rule 601.
GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY
Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
136. Torkelson v. Byrne, 68 N.D. 13, 276 N.W. 134 (1937).
137. N.D.R. Ci . P. 26(c)(4).
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.1 (1969).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1973).
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defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the competency of a witness shall be determined in ac-
cordance with State law.
This rule would seem to allow any witness to testify. Present law
in North Dakota provides that objection can be made if the witness
is incompetent because he is not able to understand the oath or is
not able to understand the question. 14 0 There is even a suggestion
in some cases that an attorney in the case, who is prohibited by
ethics from testifying, is incompetent to serve as a witness.1
1
The oath is important to a fair presentation of facts. The testi-
mony of women is decidely more accurate when an oath is admin-
istered. 142 The ability to understand questions is also important to a
fair presentation of facts. The testimony of children is markedly in-
accurate at all times.
43
Traditionally, trial judges have refused the testimony of witnes-
sess if it was shown that the witness was then badly intoxicated
while attempting to give testimony, was too young, or was mentally
incompetent. The first sentence of Rule 601 would prohibit the judge
from flatly keeping out all such testimony.
Further, in North Dakota the adoption of this rule would create
a conflict with the so-called dead man's statute.144 This statute
provides that in a suit by or against a deceased's representative
or next of kin, neither party can testify as to a transaction or state-
ment by the deceased, unless called to testify by an adverse party.'45
In Schlichenmayer v. Luithle, 4 6 the North Dakota court applied
severe restrictions on the use of the dead man's statute. The court
said that there could be cross-examination, although the dead man's
statute would apply to bar direct testimony. Furthermore the court
said there could be direct testimony when the party was not being
sued "in the capacity of executor, administrator, heir at law, or next
of kin." Consequently the court held that where an heir was being
sued, but not in the capacity of heir or next of kin, the dead man's sta-
tute was not a bar.
Another example of the North Dakota restrictive use of the dead
man's statute is the case of Kunze v. Stang.17 There, where lawsuits
were joined for trial, the parties in each of the lawsuits were com-
petent to testify for the parties of the other lawsuit, even though if
it had been one action from the beginning all parties would have
140. See State v. Oliver, 78 N.D. 341, 49 N.W.2d 564 (1951); State v. Werner, 16 N.D.
106, 112 N.W 60 (1907).
141. In re Cunninghan's Estate, 219 Minn. 80, 17 N.W.2d 885 (1944).
142. Gordon and Temerlin, Forensic P8ychologyi, 52 JUDICATURE 828, 332 (1969).
143. Id.
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § S1-01-03 (1960).
145. Knoepfle v. Suke, 108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961).
146. 221 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1974).
147. 191 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 1971).
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been prohibited from testifying because of the dead man's statute.
The court relied on the exact and literal terms of the statute refer-
ring to "parties." Nevertheless the dead man's statute does exist and
is contrary to the theory of the federal rule.
North Dakota law provides that a person who has been convicted
of perjury or of subornation of perjury cannot be received as a wit-
ness in his own behalf or as a witness between adverse parties who
object to his testifying.
148
North Dakota statutes on privilege are phrased frequently in
terms of "competency.' 1 9 Nevertheless these statutes do have to do
with privilege and are not competency rules in the strict technical
sense of "competency."
There are times when a person or object might not be usable as
a witness or as physical evidence because of constitutional bars.
Evidence which is the fruit of an unconstitutional search and seizure
cannot be used and is constitutionally incompetent.
50
A statutory bar on the competency of writings is found in sec-
tion 31-08-07, which provides that if a statement is taken from a per-
son likely to be a party to the litigation the statement may not be
used in any way unless a copy was given to the person interviewed. 5'
Although it has not been so held in North Dakota, we may ex-
pect that the North Dakota court would hold that witnesses might be
excluded from testifying because of a failure to disclose the witnes-
ses in pretrial discovery. This is particularly true in regard to the
failure to disclose expert witnesses when proper questions were ask-
ed by the party objecting at trial.
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:
A party may through interrogatories require any other
party to identify each person whom the other party expects
to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject mat-
ter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state
the substance of the fact and opinions to which the expert
is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds of each
opinion.
15 2
The rules also provide that:
A party is under the duty seasonably to supplement his re-
sponse with respect to any question directly addressed to
... the identity of each person expected to be called as an ex-
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-08 (1960).
149. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-02 (1960) (husband-wife privilege).
150. See State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965).
151. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-07 (Supp. 1973).
152. N.D.R. Cxv. P. 26(b) (4) (A) (i).
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pert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is ex-
pected to testify, and the substance of his testimony. 5 3
The above North Dakota Rules read, word for word, the same
as the Federal Rules. The official transmittal of the procedure com-
mittee of the State Bar Association to the North Dakota Supreme
Court in regard to the changes in the North Dakota Rules specifi-
cally stated in part:
It is the desire of the SBAND Procedure Committee to fol-
low the Federal Rules as closely as possible. . . . Again, we
refer the reader to the explanations of the many changes,
given by the Federal Advisory Committee. 5 4
The Federal Advisory Committee pointed out in their notes that
the reason for requiring disclosure of the names of expert witnesses
and the substance of their testimony is that in part:
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires
advance preparation. . .. Similarly effective rebuttal re-
quires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side.1 55
The Federal Advisory Committee's note of 1970 states that in re-
gard to the duty to supplement answers regarding expert witnesses:
The duty will normally be enforced, in those limited instan-
ces where it is imposed, through sanctions imposed by the
trial court, including exclusion of evidence, continuance,
or other action, as the court may deem appropriate. 56
In Gerbhard v. Niedzwiecki,157 it was held that a proper remedy
for failure to disclose a new witness who was discovered after intero-
gatories were answered was to exclude the testimony of the witness.
Rule 602
LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove per-
sonal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testi-
mony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the
153. N.D.R. CIV. P. 26(e) (1) (B).
154. Transmittal comments filed with N.D. Supreme Court at Rule 26 comments (1970).
155. Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 26, Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503-04 (1970).
156. Id. at 508.
157. 265 Minn. 471, 122 N.W.2d 110 (1968).
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provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by ex-
pert witnesses.
The rule that a lay witness may only testify as to facts he obser-
ved (but evidence to prove observation may be from his own testi-
mony) is the rule in North Dakota.1
Rule 603.
OATH OF AFFIRMATION
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to de-
clare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience
and impress his mind with his duty to do so.
North Dakota law provides that a witness shall be sworn before
testifying.5 9 Civil Rule 43 (d) provides that whenever an oath is re-
quired, an affirmation can be used in lieu therof. 180
Rule 604.
INTERPRETERS
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules
relating to qualification as an expert and the administra-
tion of an oath or affirmation that he will make a true
translation.
This federal evidence rule is compatible with North Dakota's
Criminal Rule 28(b).'" Chapter 31-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code contains provisions for interpreters and their compensation.
62
They are not incompatible with the federal rule, but instead simply
provide for a number of details which are not covered by the feder-
al evidence rule.
Rule 605.
COMPETENCY OF JUDGE AS WITNESS
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that
trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to
preserve the point.
This is contrary to Section 31-01-10 of the North Dakota Century
158. See, e.g., Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 164 N.W.2d
355 (N.D. 1968) ; Teegarden v. Dahl, 138 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1965).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-22 (1974).
160. N.D.R. Civ. P. 43(d).
161. N.D.R. CRIM. P. 28(b).
162. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 31-01 (1974).
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Code, which provides that the presiding judge or any juror may be
called as a witness by either party, but in such case it is in the dis-
cretion of the court or judge to order the trial to be postponed and to
take place before another judge or jury. 168
Rule 606.
COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) AT THE TRIAL. A member of the jury may not
testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case
in which he is sitting as a juror. If he is called so to testify,
the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to ob-
ject out of the presence of the jury.
(b) INQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF VERDICTOR IN-
DICTMENT. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a ver-
dict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter
or statement occurring during the course of the jury's de-
liberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent
to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning
his mental processes in connection therewith, except that
a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside influence was im-
properly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor 'may his
affidavit or evidence of any Statement by him concerning
a matter about what he would be precluded from testifying
be received for these purposes.
Subdivision (a) of the federal rule is contrary to North Dakota
law which permits a juror to testify, in the discretion of the trial
judge. '





The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him.
In North Dakota, the general rule is that a party may not im-
peach his own witness. This is subject to exceptions allowing im-
peachment in case of surprise or hostility. 66 However, the general
163. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 31-01-10 (1974).
164. Id.
165. See Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964) (no statements allowed as to
course of deliberations) ; James Turner & Sons v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 N.D. 347,
272 N.W. 489 (1937) (outside influences may be shown by the jurors' affidavit).
166. See George v. Trlplett, 5 N.D. 50, 63 N.W. 891, (1895) (surprise) ; State v. Hilling.
219 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1974) (hostility).
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rule that a party may not attack his own witnesses does not prevent
a party from showing other competent evidence through other wit-
nesses even though the effect of such testimony might be to contra-
dict the party's prior witnesses.
16 7
Although not adopting the federal rule, because it was unneces-
sary to do so, the North Dakota Supreme Court has said that federal
rule 607 should be adopted in North Dakota.'"
The federal rule does not clearly state that a party may not im-
peach his own testimony. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
sometimes seemed to say that the testimony of a party can never
be contradicted by another of that party's own witnesses. In Verry
v. Murphy,'69 it was stated:
It is a well recognized rule of evidence and sound principle
that a party cannot claim the benefit of a version of rele-
vant facts more favorable to him than he has made for him-
self by his own testimony. . . . It surely can never be un-
fair to a party laboring under no mental infirmity to deal




EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(a) OPINION AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE OF
CHARACTER. The credibility of a witness may be attacked
or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputa-
tion, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may
refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or other-
wise.
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting his credibility, other than convic-
tion of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discre-
tion of the court, if probative truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
(1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character
the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of his
167. Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1973).
168. See State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D. 1974).
169. 168 N.W.2d 721 (N.D. 1969).
170. Id. at 735.
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privilege against self-incrimination when examined with
respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
Rule 608 develops the material stated in Rule 404 and Rule 405.
As pointed out in the commentary on Rule 405,171 to date the North
Dakota Supreme Court has not allowed opinion testimony regarding
character (but only testimony as to reputation in the community),
and to that extent the federal rule represents a variance from the
North Dakota evidence law.
Rule 609.
IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF
CRIME
(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during cross-examination
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or im-
prionment in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, and the court determines that the pro-
bative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its pre-
judicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) TIME LIMIT. Evidence of a conviction under this
rule is not admissiable if a period of more than ten years has
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for that convic-
tion, whichever is the later date, unless the court deter-
mines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circum-
stances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. How-
ever, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written no-
tice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evi-
dence.
(c) EFFECT OF PARDON, ANNULMENT, OR CER-
TIFICATE OF REHABILITATION. Evidence of a convic-
tion is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate
or rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on
a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and
that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime
which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of
a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of innocence.
171. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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(d) JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS. Evidence of ju-
venile adjudications is generally not admissible under this
rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than
the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible
to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satis-
fied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair de-
termination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) PENDENCY OF APPEAL. The pendency of an
appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction
inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is ad-
missible.
The North Dakota court has stated that a witness may be asked
if he has committed a degrading act or if he has been convicted of
committing one. 172 The acts that he may be asked about include
those which involve dishonesty or bad morals.173 The witness may not
be asked merely if he has been arrested for committing an act, be-
cause the fact of arrest is not proof of guilt.
174
North Dakota has not directly expressed a time limit on evidence
of convictions, although the court has indicated that remoteness
might be a ground for keeping out evidence of prior convictions. In
State v. Pfaffengut,175 for example, the defendant had been convicted
of a crime of rape some 38 years previously, and the supreme court
made a special point of noting that remoteness had not been brought
to the attention of the trial court.
The North Dakota statutes on juvenile adjudications would ap-
parently not allow admission of juvenile adjudications in those in-
stances where the federal rule would allow it.17
6
When it is a party himself who is being examined in a civil
case, evidence of a criminal conviction arising out of the same matter
as that in issue in the civil case is not admissible on credibility,
because of the possible prejudice to the jury's determination in the
civil case.'7 7 But a plea of guilty by the party is admissible in his




RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR OPINIONS
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of
172. See State v. McCray, 99 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1959).
173. State v. Moe, 151 N.W.2d 310 (N.D. 1967).
174. State v. McCray, 99 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1959).
175. 77 N.W.2d 521 (N.D. 1956).
176. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974).
177. Thornburg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1968).
178. Engstrom v. Nelson,.41 N.D. 530, 171 N.W. 90 (1919).
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showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is im-
paired or enhanced.
There are no North Dakota cases or statutes in point. It is sub-
mitted, however, that in today's world inquiry into the religious be-
liefs of a witness is generally more in the nature of harassment of a
witness and a waste of time than anything else. 1 79 The proposed rule
would prevent the invoking of case law from other jurisdictions to
allow this type of questioning regarding religious beliefs or opinions.
Rule 611.
MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION
(a) CONTROL BY COURT. The court shall exercise
reasonable Control over the mode and order of interrogat-
ing witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascer-
tainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of
time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
(b) SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION. Cross-exam-
ination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the
witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, per-
mit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examina-
tion.
(c) LEADING QUESTIONS. Leading questions should
not be used on the direct examination of a witness except
as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily
leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination.
When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an adverse party, interroga-
tion may be by leading questions.
The range of cross-examination, and the order of proof, are with-
in the trial court's discretion. However, generally the North Dakota
Supreme Court has advised trial courts that in the usual case a party
should not be allowed to put in his own affirmative case under the
guise of cross-examination.8 0
When it is not a matter of substantive evidence that is sought,
but rather impeachment, the cross-examiner may then inquire re-
garding collateral matters not gone into on direct examination. The
theory is that the cross-examiner has a right to ask questions on
collateral matters which might discredit the witness or his testimony.
179. The danger of prejudice also warrants foreclosing inquiry into religious beliefs. As
McCormick noted, "the disclosure of atheism or agnosticism, or of affiliation with some
new stronge or unpopular sect, will often in many communities be fraught with intense
prejudice. C. MCCORMICK, LAW op EVmENCE § 48 at 104 (1954).
180. Mevorah v. Goodman, 79 N.D. 443, 57 N.W.2d 600 (1953) ; Hogan v. MIabo, 18 N.D.
319, 100 N.W. 847 (1904).
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But when the examiner does so he does so at his peril; the examiner
is bound by false answers on collateral matters and cannot intro-
due other evidence to the contrary.,1 The main reason for not
allowing the examiner to introduce other evidence (if the cross-ex-
amined person's answer is unfavorable) is the consumption of time
in pursuing collateral matters.
Civil Rule 43 (b) provides that a party may interrogate any un-
willing or hostile or adverse witness by leading questions. 18 2 There
are other times when it is often proper and commendable to develop
the testimony by leading questions even with a willing witness.18
Rule 612.
WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMORY
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings
by section 3500 of title 18, United States Code, if a witness
uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of
testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discre-
tion determines it is necessary in the interests of
justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced
at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness
thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which
relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that
the writing contains matters not related to the subject mat-
ter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing
in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order
delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any
portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and
made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered pursu-
ant to order under this rule, the court shall make any or-
der justice requires, except that in criminal cases when
the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be one
striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion deter-
mines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a
mistrial.
The basic theory of this evidence rule was used in State v. Bra-
athen.1'4 The court there, however, was dealing only with a memor-
andum that was used at the trial, whereas the rule goes further and
makes it clear that any document referred to by the witness prior
to his taking the witness stand might be obtained.
181. Killmer v. Duchscherer, 72 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1955) (convictions); Schnase v.
Goetz, 18 N.D. 594, 120 N.W. 553 (1909) (asking if witness sold whiskey) ; Teegarden v.
Dahl, 138 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1965) (memory of events of an accident).
182. N.D.R. Crv. P. 43(b).
183. See State v. Dwyer, 172 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1969).
184. 77 N.D. 309, 43 N.W.2d 202 (1950).
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Rule 613.
PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
(a) EXAMINING WITNESS CONCERNING PRIOR
STATEMENT. In examining a witness concerning a prior
statement made by him, whether written or not, the state-
ment need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at
that time, but on request the same shall be shown or dis-
closed to opposing counsel.
(b) EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INCONSIS-
TENT STATEMENT OF WITNESS. Extrinsic evidence of
a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissi-
ble unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain
or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of
justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to
admissions of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801(d) (2).
To a limited extent this rule is in conflict with section 31-08-07
which provides that statements taken from a person who may be a
party may not be used directly or indirectly in litigation unless a
copy was previously given to the witness. :8 5 There is no other North
Dakota case or statute law which would be contrary to this federal
evidence rule.
Although there is no North Dakota case law, it would seem that
if an adverse witness had given a statement to the adverse party,
one has the right to require the production of such statements for im-
peachment purposes and for examination, preparatory to cross-
examination, of the adverse witnesses. 86
The majority rule in the United States is that where a document
is produced in response to a call therefor by the adverse party, and
the adverse party examines it, the party producing it has the right
to have it introduced into evidence. 8 7 However, some courts do not
allow the party producing the document to introduce it into evidence
merely because the adverse party has examined it at trial. 88
Rule 614
CALLING AND INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY COURT
(a) CALLING BY COURT. The court may, on its own
motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and
all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
called.
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-07 (1974).
186. See, e.g., Shaw v. Wuttke, 137 N.W.2d 649 (Wis. 1965) (work product rule does
not apply at this stage) ; Arnovitz v. Wozar, 9 Ohio; App. 2d 16, 222 N.E.2d 660 (1964).
187. See, e.g., Leonard v. Taylor, -Mass.-, 53 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
188. See, e.g., Merlino V. Mut. Ser. Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Wis, 571, 127 N.W.2d 741 (1964).
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(b) INTERROGATION BY COURT. The court may in-
terrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.
(c) OBJECTIONS. Objections to the calling of wit-
nesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made
at the time or at the next available opportunity when the
jury is not present.
A judge presiding at a trial is not a mere moderator, but has
active duties to perform without partiality in seeing that the truth is
developed, and it is his duty, in the exercise of sound discretion, to
elicit the evidence upon relevant and material points involved in the
case.189 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated in dicta that
a trial court may call a witness as court witness and all parties
may cross-examine the witness. 190
Criminal Rule 28 makes specific reference to the court's power
to call expert witnesses on its own motion.' 9 '
Rule 615.
EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
At the request of a party the court shall order wit-
nesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of
other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own mo-
tion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party
who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of
a party which is not a natural person designated as its
representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose pre-
sence is shown by a party to be essential to the presenta-
tion of his cause.
This is a change from existing North Dakota law. In North Dakota
the sequestration of witnesses is not a matter of right and rests in the
discretion of the trial court. 92 The federal evidence rule makes it
a matter of right and mandatory for the court to sequester witnesses
when requested.' s
189. Miller v. Miller, 79 N.D. 161, 55 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1952).
190. See State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 172 (N.D. 1974).
191. N.D.R. CRIM. P. 28.
192. Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956).
193. Rule 615 is silent as to when a demand for exclusion must be made. Wigmore sum-
marized the procedure as follows:
The time for sequestration begins with the delivery of testimony upon
the stand and ends with the close of testimony.
It is therefore not appropriate during the reading of the pleadings or the
opening address of counel; . . . It continues for each witness after he has left
the stand, because it is frequently necessary to recall a witness in conse-
quence of a later witness' testimony. It need not be demanded at the very
opening of the testimony; at any time later, when the supposed exigency
arises, the order may be requested.
6 J. WeMoRE, EviDENcE § 1840 at 360 (3d ed. 1940).
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ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rule 701.
OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testi-
mony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue.
This is generally consistent with North Dakota law. Nonexpert
witnesses have been allowed to give answers in the form of opinions
as to such things as physical condition and appearance of health.'
Rule 702.
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Whether a witness offered as an expert is qualified to give an
opinion rests very largely on the discretion of the presiding judge,
whose decision will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. 95 How-
ever, in many cases the North Dakota Supreme Court has shown a
basic distrust of opinions of experts. A basic case in North Dakota
refusing testimony in the form of an expert opinion is Meehan v.
Great Northern Ry.' 96 In that case the Court said:
The general rule of law is that witnesses must state facts
within their knowledge, and not give their opinions or their
inferences . . . it is not sufficient to warrant the introduction
of expert evidence that the witness may know more of the
subject of inquiry and may better comprehend and appreciate
it than the jury. . . . The rules admitting the opinions of
experts should not be unnecessarily extended. Experience
has shown it is much safer to confine the testimony of wit-
nesses to facts in all cases where that is practicable, and leave
the jury to exercise their judgment and experience upon the
facts proved. Where witnesses testify to facts they may be
194. See Hoffer v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278, 49 N.W.2d 282 (1951) ; Myers v. Hagert Constr.,
Co., 74 N.D. 485, 23 N.W.2d 29 (1946); Jentz v. National Cas. Co., 52 N.D. 688, 204
N.W. 844 (1925).
195. City of Bismarck v. Casey, 77 N.D. 295, 43 N.W.2d 372 (1950).
196. 13 N.D. 482, 101 N.W. 183 (1904).
A NORTH DAKOTA COMMENTARY
specifically contradicted.., but they may give false opinions
without fear of punishment. It is generally safer to take the
judgments of unskilled jurors than the opinions of hired and
generally biased experts.
19 7
Thus, in North Dakota state courts a police officer's opinion as to
point of impact between vehicles is not admissible. The theory is
that the jury is as well qualified to form an opinion on the basis
of the facts.195
On the other hand, the North Dakota court has sometimes gone
to the opposite extreme in saying that only an expert can comment
on items which are generally talked about by laypersons. Such a
case was Huus v. Ringo, 99 where an expert barber testified that the
plaintiff, who was a barber, could not do as much work as the plain-
tiff did before the accident. The court held that such testimony was
incompetent and called for an expert conclusion on physical ability
which only a doctor could give.
20 0
Although a man is an expert his opinion is not admissible unless
his opinion has a requisite degree of certainty. A mere possibility
of some medical expense in the future is not a proper item of dam-
ages. Medical probability is required by statute.
20 1
Damages, of course, may involve a definite probability. Testi-
mony must not involve the element of speculation or mere possibili-
ty.2
0 2
Generally speaking the cause of a disability is essentially within
the domain of expert medical testimony.
20 3
It seems to be well settled that questions and answers
as to what is likely or liable to be the result of the injury are
not speculative or conjectural .... It is competent for a phy-
sician or surgeon to express an expert opinion as to the future
effects on consequences that may be expected to follow the
injury.
20 4
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case involving cancer arising
out of a bruise from a fall, has held that the necessary medical
certainty need only be an opinion of an expert, that the most likely
diagnosis is that which he gives, and that he believes to be true.
197. Id. at 440, 101 N.W. at 185, quoting Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 49 Am. Rep.
544, 548 (1884).
198. Bischoff v. Koenig, 100 N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1959). But see Frank's Plastering Co. v.
Koenig, 341 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1965), where a police officer's opinion as to point of im-
pact was admissible in a Federal district court In North Dakota.
199. 76 N.D. 763, 39 N.W.2d 505 (1949).
200. Id. at 777, 39 N.W.2d at 513.
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-03 (1974).
202. See Vaux v. Hamilton, 103 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1960).
203. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 101 N.W.2d 167
(1960).
204. Newton v. Gretter, 60 N.D. 635, 236 N.W. 254 (1931).
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It is not necessary that the expert opinion be free from doubt or
capable of demonstration.
2 0 5
It is not prejudicial error to admit the testimony of a doctor
as to the sequence of the various types of treatments prescribed
for known injury. It must be established as foundation that out of a
given number of people, certain numbers will not respond to the
first type of treatment of the sequence. This is true even though
the doctor testified that it is not likely that the plaintiff will need
the remainder of the sequence which he is describing. The North
Dakota Supreme Court has said that this is admissible as testimony
of fact as to the course of treatment normal to a known condition. 20 6
The doctor may testify as to the course of treatment normal to a
condition even though the course of treatment does not involve proba-
bilities. Furthermore, his testimony may be admissible to show there
is no simple or easy way to minimize future pain and suffering.20 7
However, although such testimony is admissible to show course of
treatment or the difficulty of minimizing pain in the future, unless
there is reasonable medical certainty that future surgery or medicines
are required, testimony will be not admissible to show such costs.
20 8
Rule 703.
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those per-
ceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject, the facts or dhta need not be admissible in evidence.
The federal rule was based on the common sense idea that if
a doctor relies in life and death matters on what the radiologist
told him, the doctor's testimony of diagnosis should not be thrown
out because the radiologist's oral report is not in evidence. 20 9
The federal rule is contrary to the established North Dakota law
which has held that an expert's opinion can only be based upon
facts previously testified to and in evidence.2 10 Thus in North Dakota
one expert's opinion could not be assumed as the basis of another
expert's opinion. 21'
205. Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964).
206. See Teegarden v. Dahl, 138 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1965).
207. See Holecek v. Janke, 171 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1965).
208. Id. at 100.
209. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 688 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). See also Comment, The
Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony based in Part Upon Information Received from
Third Persons, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 193 (1962).
210. Fisher v. Suko, 98 N.W.2d 895 (N.D. 1959).
211. Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931).
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Rule 704.
OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
North Dakota has followed the traditional rule that the expert
cannot give an opinion on the "ultimate issue." Thus the court, in
Mevorah v. Goodman,212 found it objectionable that an accountant
would try to testify that the way the books were kept showed a "jug-
gling of accounts." The comments by the federal advisory committee
to the Supreme Court make it clear that they intend that an expert
could give an opinion, for example, as to whether a product is "safe"
or is "defective.
' '2 1 s
Note that the rule speaks only in the instance where it has al-
ready been determined than an opinion is admissible because the
expert knows more than the jury. Therefore, the North Dakota cases
that say that the person really is not qualified to give an expert
opinion would still apply, and the patrol officer might still be pro-
hibited in North Dakota from stating where the point of impact was.
214
Rule 705.
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING
EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or infer-
ence and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure
of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlyling facts or data on cross-examination.
The established North Dakota law is that the foundation for the
expert's testimony must first be in the record, in the form of evi-
dence adduced from the witness himself or in the form of a hypothe-
tical question assuming facts. The North Dakota Supreme Court has
said that this requirement insures that there will be a basis from
which the jury can measure the value of the opinion. 1 5
212. 79 N.D. 443, 57 N.W.2d 600 (1953).
213. Bee 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. ]BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 704-02 (1975). See also
Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony-The Ultimate-Issue Rule, 40 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 147
(1963).
214. Abolition of the ultimate fact rule does not mean that all opinions must be ad-
mitted. Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to exclude statements of opinion whose
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks of prejudice, confusion, or waste
of time. In addition, Rule 705 minimizes the impact of too broad an opinion by author-
izing the judge to require a preliminary disclosure of the data which is the basis for the
opinion so that the jury will have adequate material with which to evaluate the opinion.
215. Fisher v. Suko, 98 N.W.2d 895, 901 (N.D. 1959). Bee also Minneapolis, St. P. &
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This rule leads to long hypothetical questions which invariably
become the subject matter of a standard objection that the hypothe-
tical question failed to assume relevant facts or assumes relevant
facts not yet in evidence. The objector must be reasonably specific
as to the grounds upon which he bases his objection and insofar as
interrogating counsel is in doubt as to the basis upon which the
court sustains such objection, it is interrogating counsel's right to
make inquiry of the court, and it is the court's duty to answer
that inquiry as to what is wrong with the question. 216 All of this
leads to a lot of talking before the jury finds out what the expert's
opinion is.
The danger in the opposite approach adopted by the federal
evidence rule is that an expert's opinion will be before the jury
when it is not properly there. Although the opinion may later be
struck out, it still' has made an initial imprint on the mind of the
juror.
Furthermore, the danger of the federal rule is that the cross-
examiner asks questions at his peril. Intelligent counsel may very
well even try to lay traps for the cross-examiner and have the ex-
pert prepared to state a number of extraneous grounds for the opinion




(a) APPOINTMENT. The court may on its own mo-
tion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show
cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court
may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the par-
ties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.
An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court un-
less he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be
informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of
which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in
which the parties shall have the opportunity to participate.
A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his find-
ings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party;
and he may be called to testify by the court or any party.
He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party,
including a party calling him as witness.
(b) COMPENSATION. Expert witnesses so appointed
are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum
the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is pay-
S.S.M.R. Co. v. Metal-Matic, Inc., 323 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Twin City Plaza, Inc. v.
Central Sur. and Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1969).
216. Adelmann v. Elk River Lumber Co., 242 Minn. 388, 65 N.W.2d 661 (1954).
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able from funds which may be provided by law in criminal
cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just com-
pensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil actions
and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the par-
ties in such proportion and at such time as the court di-
rects, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) DISCLOSURE OF APPOINTMENT. In the exer-
cise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure
to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert
witness.
(d) PARTIES' EXPERTS OF OWN SELECTION. No-
thing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert wit-
nesses of their own selection.
This rule is consistent with the established North Dakota law
that the court may call its own witnesses. 21 7 North Dakota's Crim-
inal Rule 28 has similar provisions regarding criminal cases. 21 8 There




The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) STATEMENT. A "statement" is (1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if
it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) DECLARANT. A "declarant" is a person who
makes a statement.
(c) HEARSAY. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted.
(d) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. A
statement is not hearsay if-
(1) PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS. The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his tes-
timony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent
with his testimony and is offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(2) ADMISSION BY PARTY-OPPONENT.
The statement is offered against a party and is
217. See text accompanying footnote 190 supra.
218. N.D.R. raM. P. 28.
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(A) his own statement, in either his individual or
a representative capacity or (B) a statement of
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
him to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concern-
ing a matter within the scope of his agency or em-
ployment, made during the existence of the rela-
tionship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of
a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
The definition of hearsay applies to written as well as oral state-
ments. 219 This and other statements in North Dakota case law cor-
respond with the federal evidence rule definition of hearsay.
Thus again, for example, proof of previous statements by a wit-
ness consistent with and corroborative of his testimony has been
held out as hearsay until an attack has been made that his story
was recently fabricated. Then previous out-of-court statements of the
witnesses are allowed in to show that what he said previously was
consistent with his present testimony, in spite of previous inconsis-
tent statements.
220
The rule is consistent with traditional North Dakota law that
where it becomes relevant to show that a certain statement was
made, regardless of the truth or falsity of the statement, such proof
is not hearsay and should be admitted. The statement is shown not
for the purpose of showing the truth of the fact stated, but merely
to show that the statement existed.
221
The federal rule, after going through a number of the changes
in the rule making process, seems to have followed the rule of the
North Dakota court in State v. Igoe, 222 holding admissible a state-
ment made at a prior hearing when the declarant is present at the
trial and is available for cross-examination.
The principal difference in the federal rule and existing North
Dakota law lies in that portion which would allow a statement made
by an agent concerning a matter within the scope of his employment
even though he was not authorized to make the statement. The law
of North Dakota has been that declarations of an employee are not
admissible as admissions of the party (and hence not a so-called
exception to the hearsay rule) except in the very limited case where
the admission or statement of the employee is within the scope of
219. Grand Forks Bldg. and Dev. Co. v. Implement Deals Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.D.
618, 31 N.W.2d 495 (1948).
220. Id. See also Wall v. Zeeb, 153 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1967).
221. See Kingdon v. Sybrant, 158 N.W.2d 863 (N.D. 1968).
222. 206 N.W.2d 291, 760 (N.D. 1973).
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the agent's employment. 2 3 The distinction that has been made be-
tween the authority to do an act and the authority to make state-
ments about it is tersely made in Friedman v. Forest City: 
2 2 4 "Appar-
ently Jennings was employed to work for the city, not to talk for
it."
In order to show an admission by an agent, it is still necessary
to prove the agency and the scope of it by traditional evidence.
Agency is a relationship resulting when one person, called "prin-
cipal," authorizes another, called "agent," to act for him in dealing
with third persons. 225 Where agency is denied, the one asserting its
existence must prove agency by proof that is clear, convincing, and
satisfactory.
2 2 6
One cannot use the alleged agent's hearsay statements or even
his testimony at trial to establish the agency.
227
The acts or declarations of an alleged agent cannot be
used, to establish his agency in the absence of evidence tend-
ing to show the principal's knowledge of such acts or declara-
tions and his assent to them.
Timely objection having been made in the instant case
to the receipt of testimony of the alleged agent, Mr. Anderson,
to establish his agency, we have no evidence of probative
value before us establishing his agency.
228
The federal rule simply defines admissions as not being hearsay
(rather than the traditional North Dakota approach of calling an
admission an exception to the hearsay rule). Practicing lawyers will
probably continue to think of admissions as being "exceptions" to
the hearsay rule, rather than following the technical language of
Rule 801 which arbitrarily defines hearsay as not being an admission.
The admissions of a party, reported by others, are always admis-
sible as substantive evidence against the party in evidence at the
trial. Admissions are substantive evidence of the fact admitted.
2 9
Admissions may be mae by word or conduct.
230
Before July 1, 1973, a plea of guilty to a criminal offense arising
out of an accident was an admission admissible in a civil case 231 al-
though the plea coul be explained.
2 32 But in 1973 North Dakota law
223. See Clark v. Payne, 48 N.D. 911, 187 N.W. 817 (1922) ; Rounseville 
v. Paulson, 119
N.D. 466, 126 N.W. 221 (1910).
224. 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752, 760 (1948).
225. Tostenson v. Ihland, 147 N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1966).
226. Id. See also Vaux v. Hamilton, 103 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1960),
227. Clark v. Payne, 48 N.D. 911, 187 N.W. 817 (1922).
228. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Anderson, 155 N.W.2d 728, 734 (N.D. 1968).
229. Hoffer v. Burd, 78 N.D. 278, 49 N.W.2d 282 (1951).
230. Harmon v. Haas, 61 N.D. 772, 241 N.W. 70 (1932) (transfer of property after auto
accident admissible to show consciousness of liability).
231. Borstad v. La Roque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959).
232. Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 538 (N.D. 1954).
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was amended to provide that admission of a traffic violation is not
admissible in any proceeding.
233
Pleadings or statements made during the proceedings at trial
are admissible as admissions. 2 34 Admissions recorded in depositions
may be evidence under the same theory as any other admission. This
is made explicit by Civil Rule 32 (a), which provides that the deposi-
tion of a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose
at the trial or upon the hearing of a motion.2 3 5 As Professor Wright
has said in commenting on the same rule in Minnesota:
The deposition of a party or the employee of a party may
be used by the party's opponent at any time for any purpose.
It makes no difference that the party may be sitting in the
courtroom, eager. to testify. His opponents have the right to
use his deposition rather, than calling him for live testimony.
2 6-
The North Dakota Court in Klen v. Harper,237 has held that portions
of a party's deposition can be introduced as an admission for any
purpose at the trial even though the party is present and testifying.
Rule 802.
HEARSAY RULE
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress.
This, of course, is the North Dakota law, except insofar as these







HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT
IMMATERIAL
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION. A state-
ment describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition, or immediately thereafter.
233. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-03(3) (Supp. 1973).
234. Gallagher v. -6offner, 77 N.D. 570, 44 N.W.2d 491 (1850); Wilson Storage v. Geur-
kenk, 242 Minn. 60, 64 N.W.2d 9 (1954).
.235. N.D.}R. CIrv. P. 32(a).
236. Wright, Minesota Rules, 173.
237. 186 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1971).
238. See Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1970).
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(2) EXCITED UTTERANCE. A statement re-
lating to a startling event or condition made while
declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) THEN EXISTING MENTAL, EMOTION-
AL, OR PHYSICAL CONDITION. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bod-
ily health), but not including a statement of mem-
ory or belief to prove the fact remembered or be-
lieved unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MED-
ICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagonosis or treat-
ment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the in-
ception or general character of the cause or ex-
ternal source thereof insofar as reasonably per-
tinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) RECORDED RECOLLECTION. A mem-
orandum or record concerning a matter about
which a witness once had knowledge but now has
insufficient recollection to enable him to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh
in his memory and to reflect that knowledge cor-
rectly. If admitted, the memorandum or record
may be read into evidence but may not itself be
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse
party.
(6) RECORDS OF REGULARY CONDUCTED
ACTIVITY. A memorandum, report, record, or da-
ta compilation, in any form, of acts, events, con-
ditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near
the time by, or from information transmitted by,
a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in. this para-
graph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) ABSENCE OF ENTRY IN RECORDS
KEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF PARAGRAPH (6). Evidence that a mat-
ter is not included in the memoranda reports, re-
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cords, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6),
to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a mem-
orandum, report, record, or data compilation was
regularly made and preserved, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances indicate lack
of trustworthiness.
(8) PUBLIC RECORDS AND REPORTS. Re-
cords, reports, statements, or data compilations,
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting
forth (A) the activities of the office or agency,
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed
by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases mat-
ters observed by police officers and other law en-
forcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in cri-
minal cases, factual findings resulting from an in-
vestigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) RECORDS OF VITAL STATISTICS. Re-
cords or data compilations, in any form, of births,
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report
thereof was made to a public office pursuant to re-
quirements of law.
(10) ABSENCE OF PUBLIC RECORD OR
ENTRY. To prove the absence of a record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the
nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which
a record, report, statement, or data compilation,
in any form, was regularly made and preserved by
a public office or agency, evidence in the form of
a certification in accordance with rule 902, or testi-
mony, that diligent search failed to disclose the re-
cord, report, statement, or data compilation, or en-
try.
(11) RECORDS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZA-
TIONS. Statements of births, marriages, divorces,
deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood
or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or
family history, contained in a regularly kept record
of a religious organization.
(12) MARRIAGE, BAPTISMAL, AND SIM-
ILAR CERTIFICATES. Statements of fact con-
tained in a certificate that the maker performed
a marriage or other ceremony or administered
a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official,
or other person authorized by the rules or practices
of a religious organization or by law to perform the
act certified, and purporting to have been issued
at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
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(13) FAMILY RECORDS. Statements of fact
concerning personal or family history contained in
in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings
on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engrav-
ings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
(14) RECORDS OF DOCUMENTS AFFECT-
ING AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY. The record
of a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property, as proof of the content of
the original recorded document and its execution
and delivery by each person by whom it purports
to have been executed, if the record is a record
of a public office and an applicable statute au-
thorizes the recording of documents of that kind
in that office.
(15) STATEMENTS IN DOCUMENTS AF-
FECTING AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY. A
statement contained in a document purporting to
establish or affect an interest in property if the
matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the
document, unless dealings with the property since
the document was made have been inconsistent
with the truth of the statement or the purport of
the document.
(16) STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT DOCU-
MENTS. Statements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is
established.
(17) MARKET REPORTS, COMMERCIAL
PUBLICATIONS. Market quotations, tabulations,
lists, directories, or other published compilations,
generally used and relied upon by the public or by
persons in particular occupations.
(18) LEARNED TREATISES. To the extent
called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
examination, statements contained in published
treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testi-
mony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits.
(19) REPUTATION CONCERNING PER-
SONAL OR FAMILY HISTORY. Reputation among
members of his family by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, or among his associates, or in the community,
concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, di-
vorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact
of his personal or family history.
(20) REPUTATION CONCERNING BOUND-
ARIES OR GENERAL HISTORY. Reputation in a
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community, arising before the controversy, as to
boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the
community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or na-
tion in which located.
(21) REPUTATION AS TO CHARACTER.
Reputation of a person's character among his associ-
ates or in the community.
(22) JUDGMENT OF PREVIOUS CONVIC-
TION. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after
a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea
of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in ex-
cess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sus-
tain the judgment, but not including, when offered
by the Government in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pen-
dency of an appeal may be shown but does not
affect admissibility.
(23) JUDGMENT AS TO PERSONAL, FAM-
ILY OR GENERAL HISTORY, OR BOUNDARIES.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family
or general history, or boundaries, essential to the
judgment, if the same would be provable by evi-
dence of reputation.
(24) OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his in-
tention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the declar-
ant.
It might be noted at the beginning that the frequently heard
trial objection that material is "self serving" is not North Dakota
law. If evidence is admissible, even as an exception to the hearsay
rule, it cannot be excluded because it is "self serving," i.e., promotes
the interest of the person from whom the evidence originates.
289
239. See Trautman v. New Rockford-Fessenden Co-op Transp. Ass'n., 181 N.W.2d 754
(N.D. 1970).
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1. Rule Subdivisions 1 and 2 Regarding Present Sense Impression
and Excited Utterances
In North Dakota, excited utterances and reports of present sense
impression have generally been discussed by use of the term "res
gestae." The vagueness of the term "res gestae" has allowed it to
be used to prove the existence of the exciting occasion which is the
foundation for letting the statement into evidence as arising out of
an exciting occasion.2 40 Text writers condemn the use of the term.
24 1
Nevertheless, our court has frequently used the term. Our court
has not been alone in using the term "res gestae" in describing
excited utterances or reports of present sense impressions. An illus-
trative case is Moreno v. Hawbaker,2 where the phrase "look at
those fools go" was allowed into evidence. Generally "res gestae"
has been used to mean a part of the occurrence being litigated,
given in response to stimulation produced by occurrence, under cir-
cumstances which eliminate -intention or opportunity for fabrication. 24 8
"Res gestae" does not extend to a mere narration soon after the
event but outside the spontaneous influence of the event.
24
4
Thus although our court has used the term "res gestae" instead
of "excited utterance" or "present sense impression," the basic the-
ory of admissibility has been the same as the federal rule. It is
to be hoped that the term "res gestae" would be eliminated in the
future and our court would continue the same theory, but under the
more exact terms of the federal rule.
2. Rule Subdivision 3 Regarding Then Existing Mental, Emotional
or Physical Condition
North Dakota has always allowed spontaneous manifestations of
distress which naturally accompany and furnish evidence of existing
suffering.-
The rule's specific reference that statements of intent may be
admissible is consistent with North Dakota law. If intent is at issue,
statements made to show intent or purpose are admissible.2 4 6 Such
statements are admissible even if made from. the witness stand at
trial and obviously then self serving.
24 7
240. Gotchy v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bur., 49 N.D. 915, 194 N.W. 663 (1923).
241. See, e.g., 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1745-1764 (3d ed. 1940).
242. 157 Cal. App. 2d 627, 821 P.2d 538 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
248. Myers v. Hagert Constr. Co., 74 N.D. 520, 28 N.W.2d 29 (1946); Balding v.
Andrews, 12 N.D. 267, 96 N.W. 305 (1903).
244. State v. Murphy, 17 N.D. 48, 115 N.W. 84 (1908).
245. Jacobson v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n., 70 N.D. 566, 296 N.W. 545
(1941).
246. Shong v. Farmers and Merchants' State Bank, 70 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1955).
247. Hochstetler v. Graber, 78 N.D. 90, 48 N.W.2d 16 (1951).
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3. Rule Subdivision 4 Regarding Statements for Purposes of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment
Although the North Dakota court has not discussed this very
important exception, it is commonly accepted in the trial courts of
this state. Certainly it is consistent with the theory used in the re-
ported cases from other jurisdictions in the Northwestern Reporter
system.
48
It might be noted that the wording of this rule allows statements
made to a doctor by someone other than the patient. Thus statements
made to a doctor for purposes of treatment, even though not spon-
taneous, and not descriptive of a present condition, might be given
by the parent of an infant.2 9 Further, it should be noted that state-
ments made to a psychiatrist are admissible, even if the plaintiff
is bringing a suit at the same time.
250
It is the statement made for purposes of the medical diagnosis
and which describes medical history that is admissible. It is not
what the doctor tells the patient. The plaintiff cannot testify as to
what the doctor told him.
251
4. Rule Subdivision 5 Regarding Recorded Recollection
If the witness has no present memory of the events shown in the
memo, but testifies the memo was accurate and written by him
while the events were fresh in his mind, the memo may be admit-
ted.
25 2
5. Rule Subdivision 6 Regarding Records of Regularly Conducted
Activity
This rule is the familiar business records exception, but in slight-
ly different form than we are used to it. North Dakota Century
Code Chapter 31-08 has the business records exception in statutory
form. North Dakota has commonly allowed such records. 253 The court




It is to be noted that the federal rule allows the record of any
act, event or opinion, anything that is in the record, to go into evi-
dence. 255 This is contrary to the North Dakota Supreme Court's ex-
248. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 778 (1971).
249. Gordon v. Engineering Constr. Co., 271 Minn. 186, 135 N.W.2d 202 (1965).
250. Ritter v. Coca-Cola Co., 24 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W.2d 439 (1964).
251. See, e.g., Johnson v. Iron River, 149 Wis. 139, 135 N.W. 522 (1912) (Physician said
ribs were broken); Trott v. Chicago Rhode Island Ry., 115 Iowa 80, 86 N.W. 38 (1901)
(Physician said further treatment was necessary).
252. Walker v. .Larson, 284 Minn. 99, 169 N.W.2d 737 (1969); State v. Braathen, 77
N.D. 309, 43 N.W.2d 202 (1950).
253. See, e.g., J. R. Watkins Co. v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 64;. (N.D. 1962).
254. See Interstate Collection Agency v. Kuntz, 181 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 1970).
255. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EvWDNCE 803-38 to -39 (1975).
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pression in Munro v. Privratsky,56 where out court apparently was of
the opinion that the business records as evidence does not authorize
the introduction in evidence of the recorded opinion or diagnosis of a
physician. This rule also would seem to allow in evidence a recording
of an event even though it is not recorded by the business for its
own business purpose. Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co.,2 5 7 exclud-
ing the portion of the hospital record regarding how the accident
happened, would apparently have had a different result under this
rule.
6. Subdivision 7 Regarding Absence of Entry in Records
Once business records are admitted it seems logical to allow
the records to be admitted to show the absence of a regularly con-
ducted type of entry under certain circumstances. The best state-
ment of this given in a Minnesota case is as follows:
In proving its case, the plaintiff, of necessity, was obliged
to resort to indirect and negative evidence, in order to prove
that the note had not been paid, and that its nonpayment had
been concealed from the bank. Therefore evidence of the cus-
tomary course of business of the bank, as to entries in its
books and records when a note was received and when it was
paid, in connection with evidence of the existence or absence
of such entries as to this particular note, was competent and
material.
2 5 8
8. Rule Subdivision 8 Regarding Public Records and Reports
North Dakota has much statutory law regarding the admissi-
bility of public records and reports. The basic chapter is 31_09.259
Perhaps the most important in terms of regular use in the courts
is Section 31-09-11 which is the uniform law regarding official reports
or findings of fact and provides that they are admissible in evidence
under certain circumstances designed to prevent surprise. Section
54-46.1-03 of the North Dakota Century Code is the basic statute re-
garding the admissibility of records and reports "in any form" and
allows reproductions and certified copies.
260
There are many sections scattered throughout the statutes re-
garding individual items of public record which are admissible. They
range from the admissibility of records of the Board of Embalmers
261
to the admissibility of analyses made by a chemist in the State
256. 209 N.W.2d, 745, 752 (N.D. 1973).
257. 80 N.W.2d 90 (1956).
258. First National Bank of Shakopee v. Strait, 65 Minn. 162, 166, 67 N.W. 987, 988
(1896).
259. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 31-09 (1960).
260. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-46.1-03 (1974).
261. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-10-07 (1960).
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Laboratories Department. 262 In short the rule expressed here is cer-
tainly well-embedded in the statutory law of North Dakota.
The courts have likewise seemed enthusiastically to embrace the
idea of letting in official records. North Dakota has even gone so far
as to allow hospital records of a veterans administration hospital to
be admissible as public records.
26S
9. Rule Subdivision 9 Regarding Records of Vital Statistics
This is presently the law in regard to births and deaths in North
Dakota.
26 4
10. Rule Subdivision 13 Regarding Family Records
An excellent discussion of a similar rule and its use in North
Dakota is found in In re Peterson's Estate.
2 65
11. Rule Subdivision 14 Regarding Documents Regarding Real Pro-
perty
North Dakota has statutes which allow the records of real pro-
perty instruments to be received in evidence.
26 6
12. Rule Subdivision 17 Regarding Market Reports
This rule is considered a radical departure from the common
law. Surprisingly, North Dakota had early dicta indicating that mar-
ket reports of price quotations would be competent evidence.2 17
13. Rule Subdivision 18 Regarding Learned Treatises
In Iverson v. Lancaster,268 it was held that a cross-examiner
may use treatises and books, the authority of which is established
in any manner acceptable to the trial court, to test the qualifica-
tions and opinions of the experts, regardless of whether the expert
witness has relied upon or recognized the treatise in itself. Although
the case applied to the cross-examination of a doctor, the reasoning
would seem to apply to any expert.
The federal rule goes further in several respects. First of all it
allows the statement to go into evidence as substantive evidence.
Secondly and perhaps more important, it allows statements contained
in learned treatises to go in as a part of direct examination if the
expert says he has relied upon it. Thus, in the initial direct examina-
262. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-01-10 (1971).
263. See Thomas v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 65 N.D. 625, 260 N.W. 605 (1935).
264. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02-40 (1970).
265. 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751 (1912).
266. The basic statutes are N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-45 (1960) (regarding instruments
of record in the Register of Deeds Office) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-01-22 (1960) (re-
garding abstracts of title).
267. See Schnitz Bros. v. Bolles & Rogers Co., 48 N.D. 673, 186 N.W. 96, 98 (1922).
268. 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968).
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tion the attorney may get into evidence the fact that the text writers
support what the witness is saying.
2 9
14. Rule Subdivision 22 Regarding Evidence of Conviction or Plea
of Guilty
The North Dakota hw has traditionally allowed admission into
evidence in a -civil case a plea of guilty made by the defendant in a
prior criminal case involving the same fact situation. The theory
was that the plea was an admission of a party. However, the North
Dakota court refused to allow evidence that a conviction had occur-
red. The sole exception was that a prior conviction of certain types
of offenses could be shown for impeachment purposes only, and then
the jury had to be instructed that the conviction was not substantive
evidence of the facts involved in the civil case.
270
In North Dakota, by statute, admissions of traffic offenses or
convictions of traffic offenses may not be referred to or admitted
into evidence in any proceeding. 271 Probably this statute (and its
underlying policy) would prevail in a conflict with the federal rule
allowing admissibility, since the statute is more a rule of privilege
than of evidence.
Although the federal rule is a change from existing North Dakota
law regarding the use of convictions, the difference in many cases
may be more technical than actual. Since the jury can be told
about felonies for purposes of "impeachment," it is likely they will
consider it for substantive purposes anyway.
Rule 804.
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(a) DEFINITION OF UNAVAILABILITY. "Unavail-
ability as a witness" includes situations in which the de-
clarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the
subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning
the subject matter of his statement despite an or-
der of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject
matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the
hearing because of death or then existing physical
or mental illness or infirmity; or
269. So that the jurors will not be unduly impressed by the treatise and so they will not
use the text as a starting point for conclusions not supported by expert testimony, the
last sentence of Rule 803 (18) prohibits the admission of treatises as exhibits.
270. Engstrom v. Nelson, 41 N.D. 530, 171 N.W. 90 (1919).
271. N.D. CENT. CODE § 89-06.1-03 (Supp. 1973).
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(5) is absent from the hearing and the pro-
ponent of his statement has been unable to procure
his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay excep-
tion under subdivision (b) (2), (3), or (4), his atten-
dance or testimony) by process or other reasonable
means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemp-
tion, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or ab-
sence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the pro-
ponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
(b) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. The following are
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is un-
available as a witness:
(1) FORMER TESTIMONY. Testimony given
as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an oppor-
tunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(2) STATEMENT UNDER BELIEF OF IM-
PENDING DEATH. In a prosecution for homicide
or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made
by a declarant while believing that his death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of
what he believed to be his impending death.
(3) STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST. A
statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest, or so far tended to subject him
to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by him against another, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the state-
ment unless he believed it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal lia-
bility and offered to exculpate the accused is not ad-
missible unless corroborating circumstances clear-
ly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
(4) STATEMENT OF PERSONAL OR FAM-
ILY HISTORY. (A) A statement concerning the de-
clarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce,
legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history, even though declarant had no
means of acquiring personal knowledge of the mat-
ter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the fore-
going matters, and death also, of another person,
if the declarant was related to the other by blood,
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately as-
sociated with the other's family as to be likely to
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have accurate information concerning the matter
declared.
(5) OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his in-
tention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the de-
clarant.
North Dakota has held that statements based on first hand know-
ledge which are against the precuniary or proprietary interest of the




Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under
the hearsay rule if each party of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided
in these rules.
There are no North Dakota cases dealing with this provision.2 7 3
Rule 806.
ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY OF DECLARANT
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in
Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E,), has been admitted in
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked,
and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had
testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct
by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay
statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may
272. See Heuer v. Heuer, 64 N.D. 497, 253 N.W. 856 (1934) ; Silbernagel v. Silbernagel,
79 N.D. 279, 55 N.W.2d 713 (1952).
273. See generally 4 J. WEmNSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVMENCZ 805 (1975).
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have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the
party against whom a hearsay statement has been admit-
ted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled
to examine him on the statement as if under cross-exami-
nation.
There are no North Dakota cases dealing with this provision.274
ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Rule 901.
REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION OR IDENTIFICATION
(a) GENERAL PROVISION. The requirement of au-
thentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.
(b) ILLUSTRATIONS. By way of illustration only,
and not by way of limitation, the following are examples
of authentication or identification conforming with the re-
quirements of this rule:
(1) TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITH KNOW-
LEDGE. Testimony that a matter is what is claim-
ed to be.
(2) NONEXPERT OPINION ON HANDWRIT-
ING. Nonexpert opinion as to genuineness of
handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired
for purposes of the litigation
(3) COMPARISON BY TRIER OR EXPERT
WITNESS. Comparison by the trier of fact or by ex-
pert witnesses with specimens which have been au-
thenticated.
(4) DISTINCTIVE, CHARACTERISTICS AND
AND THE LIKE. Appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteris-
tics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) VOICE IDENTIFICATION. Identification
of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through
mechanical or electronic transmission or recording,
by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any
time under circumstances connecting it with the
alleged speaker.
(6) TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS. Tele-
phone conversations, by evidence that a call was
made to the number assigned at the time by the
telephone company to a particular person or busi-
ness, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances,
including self-identification, show the person an-
274. See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 806 (1975).
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swering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of
a business, the call was made to a place of busi-
ness and the conversation related to business rea-
sonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) PUBLIC RECORDS OR REPORTS. Evi-
dence that a writing authorized by law to be re-
corded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a
public office, or a purported public record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, is
from the public office where items of this nature
are kept.
(8) ANCIENT DOCUMENTS OR DATA COM-
PILATION. Evidence that a document or data com-
pilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to
create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B)
was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely
be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more
at the time it is offered.
(9) PROCESS OR SYSTEM. Evidence de-
scribing a process or system used to produce a re-
sult and showing that the process or system pro-
duces an accurate result.
(10) METHODS PROVIDED BY STATUTE
OR RULE. Any method of authentication or identi-
fication provided by Act of Congress or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority.
This rule is similar to existing North Dakota law. However,
the objection of no sufficient showing of identity or verification is
not generally voiced in North Dakota courts as an objection of "lack
of authentication or identification." The form of the objection is us-
ually: "The evidence (or exhibit) is objected to upon the ground
that no sufficient or proper foundation has been laid."
The following foundations are grouped here for convenience.
These are the foundations most used in trials. For a foundation for
each of the following matters, present North Dakota law would re-
quire a showing of the items indicated.
1. Identity of the Evidence
a. Who had custody of evidence from time it was discovered.
b. What each person did with it while in their custody and that
there was no change or alteration in it.
c. All persons who handled the evidence should be called to test-
ify concerning their period of custody.
2 7 5
275. See Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bur., 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1963)
(blood sample; a lack of evidence showing tampering is not enough; there must be posi-
tive evidence there was no change or tampering).
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2. Business Records
a. Identity of the record.
b. Person testifying has charge of records or knows how they
are prepared and kept.
c. Method of preparation, when made, and from what source.
d. Record is kept in the usual course of business.
e. Record is kept by someone authorized to keep it; has been
part of business records since made up.
f. Record believed to be true and correct. 276
3. Past Recollection Recorded
a. Has no present recollection (without use of the memo).
b. Remembers memo.
c. Memo was written shortly after incident or while events still
fresh in mind.
d. When made or Aeen, memo was known to be correct.




a. Prior conduct of the parties, if any, relating to use of phone.
b. Time of phone call.
c. Person was asked for or identified himself.
d. Person's voice was recognized by the witness.
e. Substance of conversation also identified the person. 278
5. Pictures
a. Identify photo as portrayal of certain facts.
b. (Helpful, but not necessary) as much as possible as to how
pictures taken and when.
c. (Helpful, but not necessary) as much as possible about wit-
ness familiarity.
d. Photo is a correct representation of those facts.
e. Explain any difference between items shown in photo and i-
tems at time of occurrence.
27 19
6. Sound Recordings
a. Mechanical transcription device was capable of taking testi-
mony.
276. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01 (1960); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Golde, 190 N.W.2d
752 (N.D. 1971) (Person in charge of records does not have to be testifying and exhibits
may be photocopies).
277. If memory is revived, then the witness should testify from present revived memory.
See Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Elec., Inc.,,250 Iowa 599, 94 N.W.2d 750 (1959).
278. See Ley v. Home Ins. Co., 64 N.D. 200, 251 N.W. 137 (1933).
279. See Hotten v. Amsden, 161 N.W.2d 478, 484 (N.D. 1968) ; Froemke v. Hauff, 147
N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1966) ; Moulton v. Globe Mut. Ins. Co., 36 S.D. 339, 154 N.W. 830
(1915).
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b. Operator of device was competent to operate the device.
c. Establish authenticity and correctness of the recordings.
d. No changes, additions or deletions have been made.
e. Identification of the speakers.
f. Circumstances of taking the recording.
28 0
7. Photocopy
A. Made by business, professional man, or government.
b. Made in the usual course of business or activity.
c. Made by process which accurately reproduces the original.
281
8. Demonstrative Evidence
a. It would help the witness explain X to use the exhibit.
b. The witness has examined the exhibit.
c. The exhibit is correct.
28 2
9. Medical Bills
A. The medical services were rendered because of the injury.
b. The medical services were necessary.
c. The medical bills offered show the amount paid or the liabil-
ity incurred.
2 2
10. Exhibition of Injuries
A. The injury was received in the accident.
2 8 4
11. Maps and Diagrams
a. That the map or diagram was prepared by the witness or un-
der his direction.
b. That the items shown thereon actually existed and were seen
by him.
c. The scale, or lack of scale, used in the map or diagram.
d. Generally the area or items attempted to be shown and con-
veyed to the trier of facts.
e. The witness has examined the exhibit.
f. The exhibit is correct.
285
280. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958).
281. See N.D. CENT. CODE (Supp. 1963).
282. See, e.g., Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964) (decedent's jacket) ; Thorn-
burg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1969) (Picture of same general type of injuries).
283. See, e.g., Klein v. Harper, 186 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1971) (although the proper measure
of damages is the reasonable value of medical services, the amount paid or the liability
incurred is evidence which can go to the jury to assist it in determining the reasonable
value of services); Munro v. Prtvratsky, 209 N.W.2d 745, 753 (N.D. 1973) (sufficient
foundation for drug bills was testimony that the blil was for medicine received from the
pharmacy and that it had been prescribed by the doctor for injuries in the accident).
284. See Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 55 N.D. 853, 213 N.W. 841
(1927).
285. See, eg., Froemke v. E-auff, 147 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1966); Grenz v. Werre, 129
N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1950).
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12. Handwriting
a. The witness has become familiar with the handwriting of the
person involved or,
b. Items purporting to be the handwriting of the person involved




Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition pre-
cedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the
following:
(1) DOMESTIC PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UN-
DER SEAL. A document bearing a seal purporting
to be that of the United States, or of any State, dis-
trict, Commonwealth, territory, or insular posses-
sion thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a poli-
tical subdivision, department, officer, or agency
thereof, and a signature purporting to be an at-
testation or execution.
(2) DOMESTIC PUBLIC DOCUMENTS NOT
UNDER SEAL. A document purporting to bear the
signature in his official capacity of an officer or
employee of any entity included in paragraph (1)
hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a
seal and having official duties in the district or
political subdivision of the officer or employee cer-
tifies under seal that the signer has the official ca-
pacity and that the signature is genuine.
(3) FOREIGN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. A do-
cument purporting to be executed or attested in his
official capacity by a person authorized by the laws
of a foreign country to make the execution or at-
testation, and accompanied by a final certification
as to the genuineness of the signature and official
position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or
(B) of any foreign official whose certificate of gen-
uineness of signature and official position relates to
the execution or attestation or is in a chain of cer-
tificates of genuineness of signature and official po-
sition relating to the execution or attestation. A fi-
nal certification may be made by a secretary of em-
bassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul;
or consular agent of the United States, or a diplo-
matic or consular official of the foreign country as-
signed or accredited to the United States. If reason-
able opportunity has been given to all parties to in-
vestigate the authenticity and accuracy of official
286. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-02.1 (1960). See also U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Borr.
157 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1968).
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documents, the court may, for good cause shown,
order that they be treated as presumptively authen-
tic without final certification or permit them to be
evidenced by an attested summary with or without
final certitification.
(4) CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC RE-
CORDS. A copy of an official record or report or
entry therein, or of a document authorized by law
to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or
filed in a public office, including data compilations
in any form, certified as correct by the custodian
or other person authorized to make the certifi-
cation, by certificate complying with paragraph
(1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any
Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority.
(5) OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS. Books, pam-
phlets, or other publications purporting to be issued
by public authority.
(6) NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS.
Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or
periodicals.
(7) TRADE INSCRIPTIONS AND THE
LIKE. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purport-
ing to have been affixed in the course of business
and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
(8) ACKNOWLEDGED DOCUMENTS. Docu-
ments accompanied by a certificate of acknowledg-
ment executed in the manner provided by law by a
notary public or other officer authorized by law to
take acknowledgments.
(9) COMMERCIAL PAPER AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS. Commercial paper, signatures there-
on, and documents relating thereto to the extent
provided by general commercial law.
(10) PRESUMPTIONS UNDER ACTS OF
CONGRESS. Any signature, document, or other
matter declared by Act of Congress to be presump-
tively or prima facie genuine or authentic.
The rule providing that certified copies of public records and
other types of records do not need to have extrinsic evidence or




In the case of foreign records, our court has required a foundation
to be laid proving the laws which make the records official records
in the foreign country.
28
Rule 903.
SUBSCRIBING WITNESS' TESTIMONY UNNECESSARY
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not neces-
287. See N.D.R. Cry. P. 44; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 31-09 (1960).
288. See In re Peterson, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751 (1912).
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sary to authenticate a writing unless required by the laws
of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of the
writing.
North Dakota has never required the testimony of a subscribing
witness in order to allow the writing to go into evidence, providing
it has been otherwise identified. 2 9 The sole exception lies in the pro-
bate law which provides that the the probate of a written will, upon
a contest, at least one of the subscribing witnesses must be examined
to authenticate the instrument.
290




For purposes of this article the following definitions
are applicable:
(1) WRITINGS AND RECORDINGS. "Writ-
ings" and "recordings" consist of letters, words, or
numbers, or their equivalent, set down by hand-
writing, typewriting, printing, photostating, photo-
graphing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electron-
ic recordings, or other form of data compilation.
(2) PHOTOGRAPHS. "Photographs" include
still photographs, X-ray films, video tapes, and mo-
tion pictures.
(3) ORIGINAL. An "original" of a writing or
recording is the writing or recording itself or any
counterpart intended to have the same effect by a
person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a
photograph includes the negative or any print
therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or simi-
lar device any printout or other output readable by
sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an
"original".
(4) DUPLICATE. A "duplicate" is a counter-
part produced by the same impression as the ori-
ginal, or from the same matrix, or by means of pho-
tography, including enlargements and miniatures,
or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent tech-
niques which accurately reproduces the original.
289. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-02 (1960). which abrogates the common law rule and provides
that it is not necessary to call subscribing witnesses. See also McManus v. Commow, 10
N.D. 340, 87 N.W. 8 (1901).
290. N.D. CENT. CODE 30.1-15-06 (1975).
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There is no counterpart in North Dakota defining the various
terms that are defined in this rule. The federal rule does eliminate
a lot of common law problems of definition of what is a "writing"
and what is an "original."2 1
Rule 1002.
REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINAL
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photo-
graph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is re-
quired, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by
Act of Congress.
The best evidence rule has long been the rule in North Dakota.
When the pontents of the document themselves are in issue, other





A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the ori-
ginal.
Federal Rule 1001 defines "duplicate" to include photocopies. 293
Photocopies if made "in the regular course of business" are admis-
sible in North Dakota whether the original is in existence or not.2 9,
Rule 1004.
ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE OF CONTENTS
The original is not required, and other evidence of the
contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admis-
sible if-
(1) ORIGINALS LOST OR DESTROYED. All
originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless
the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith;
291. The Advisory Committee chose to use the term "writings" in the sense it is generally
understood. See generally Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence-An Attempt at
Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1061, 1070 (1969): "[The rules of evi-
dence] are written in lawyer's language using words in the sense generally attributed to
those words by the average practitioner. Neither judge nor advocate needs to learn a spe-
cial vocabulary to handle the content of the rules."
292. De Nault v. Hoerr, 66 N.D. 82, 262 N.W. 361 (1935) ; Rott v. Providence Life Ins.
Co., 67 N.D. 529, 274 N.W. 849 (1997).
293. See FED. R. Evm. 1001. See also Comment, Authentication and the Best Evidence
Rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. Rgv. 227 (1969).
294. N.D. CENT. CODE § 81-08-01.1 (1960).
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or
(2) ORIGINAL NOT OBTAINABLE. No ori-
ginal can be obtained by any available judicial pro-
cess or procedure; or
(3) ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF OPPON-
ENT. At a time when an original was under the
control of the party against whom offered, he was
put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that
the contents would be a subject of proof at the hear-
ing, and he does not produce the original at the
hearing; or
(4) COLLATERAL MATTERS. The writing,
recording, or photograph is not closely related to a
controlling issue.
This is generally in accord with North Dakota law. A number of
North Dakota cases have allowed evidence of the contents of a writ-
ing to be testified to when the originals were lost or destroyed or
not obtainable.
295
Generally when the best evidence is in the hands of the adverse
party it is necessary to make a demand upon the adverse party to pre-
sent it before the secondary evidence can be introduced.2 96. However,
when the adverse party is on notice by the pleadings or otherwise,
then such an extra demand does not need to be- made in North Dako-
ta.2
97
Although not directly discussed in North Dakota cases, the import
of the cases is in accordance with the general rule that if the con-
tents of the writing are not in issue or if the writing is only collater-
ally involved, the best evidence rule does not apply and other means




The contents of an official record, or of a document
authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded
or filed, including data compilations in any form, if other-
wise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as cor-
rect in accordance with rule 902 or testified to be correct
by a witness who has compared it with the original. If a
copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, then other evi-
dence of the contents may be given.
295. See Linnell v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 74 N.D. 399; 22 N.W.2d 209
(1946); Odegaard v. Investors 011, 118 N.W.2d 362 (N.D. 1962); Umphrey v. Deery, 78
N.D. 211, 48 N.W.2d 897 (1951).
296. Ley v. Home Ins. Co., 64 N.D. 200, 251 N.W. 137 (1933).
297. Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Charlebols, 10 N.D. 446, 88 N.W. 80 (1901).
298. This is the common law rule and Is well exemplified in Johnson v. Carlin, 121 Minn.
176, 141 N.W. 4 (1913).
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North Dakota, of course, allows proof of the public records by
copy.2 9 However, the exception to the best evidence rule by testi-
mony of a witness who has looked at the contents or allowing other
methods of proving the contents of a public record is not the present
North Dakota law. 00
Rule 1006.
SUMMARIES
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or
photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in
court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary,
or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made
available for examination or copying, or both, by other
parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order
that they be produced in court.
Where many papers or books make introduction into evidence,
and an examination, of all of the books and records very laborious,
the trial court may in its discretion permit a competent witness
who has examined all of the material to testify as to his conclusions
as to what is contained or to present schedules verified by his testi-
mony summarizing the examination. However, to allow such sum-
marization of books and records, either: (1) the books and records
must have been introduced into evidence or are available to the
court and opposing attorneys; or (2) the books and records have been
lost or destroyed without the proponent's fault.3 01
The non-existence of an entry in records should be shown by the
records themselves as the best evidence that an entry does not exist.
However, if the voluminous character of the records makes that
type of evidence impracticable, only the custodian of the records
should testify as to the non-existence of the entry.30 2
Rule 1007.
TESTIMONY OR WRITTEN ADMISSION OF PARTY
Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may
be proved by the testimony or deposition of the party
against whom offered or by his written admission, without
accounting for the nonproduction of the original.
299. See text accompanying note 287 infra.
300. Certification under Rule 902 or an attestation by a witness that he has favorably
compared the copy to the original, means that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the
original, not that the contents of the original are necessarily accurate. 5 J. WEINSTEI &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN9s EVIDENCE 1005-11 (1975).
301. See Mevorah v. Goodman, 79 N.D. 443, 57 N.W.2d 600 (1958); Linnell v. London
& Lancashire Indem. Co., 74 N.D. 379, 22 N.W.2d 203 (1946).
302. Sykes v. Beck, 12 N.D. 242, 96 N.W. 844 (1903).
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This federal rule of evidence is contrary to the North Dakota
rule which has required the production of the original or at least
a demand or accounting for it before proceeding to prove it by the
admission of the adverse party.303
Rule 1008.
FUNCTIONS OF COURT AND JURY
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents
of writings, recordings, or photographs under these rules
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordin-
arily for the court to determine in accordance with the pro-
visions of rule 104. However, when an issue is raised (a)
whether the asserted writing ever existed, or (b) whether
another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the
trial is the original, or (c) whether other evidence of con-
tents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the
trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues
of fact.
The general theory of this rule is consistent with the theory that
has been used in North Dakota. Our court has pointed out that
where the question of admissibility of evidence depends on a disputed
state of facts, the court may submit the evidence to the jury with
proper hypothetical instructions on the laws which will govern them
upon the different states of facts that they might find. s04
303. Kalman v. Dinnie, 45 N.D. 112, 176 N.W. 656 (1920) ; Ley v. Home Ins. Co., 64 N.D.
200, 251 N.W. 137 (1933).
804. See King v. Hanson, 13 N.D. 85, 99 N.W. 1085 (1904). The growth of data process-
ing technology raises unique problems in the context of the best evidence rule and rule
1008.
A computer printout which displays the results of calculations performed by
the equipment is an original writing and admissible as such. See Rules
901(b) (9) and 1001(3). Where, however, the computer is used merely as a
data storage and retrieval device and performs no transformations, the print-
out becomes secondary eidence of the original documents which provided the
input. Thus, where corporations periodically read their corporate records into
a computer storage bank and subsequently destroy the originals or where en-
tire corespondence files are stored in this manner or legal documents or con-
tracts or deeds or trial transcripts provide input for storage, the data retrieved
is merely a sophisticated copy of the original writings. As copies, their admis-
sibility may be challenged on the grounds of inaccuracy or machine error.
While the evidence as to the operation of the machine and error factors may
be complex, the question of accuracy is still one for the jury under Rule
1008. The court must, however, find that a reasonable juror could find the
copy reliable. See Rules 104 (b) and 901.
5 J. WEINSTEIN & M3. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvMENCE 1008-07 (1975).
